Office of the Historian

272. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

Washington, June 12, 1964.

SUBJECT

  • Possible Statement by the President on Cuba

I understand from Tom Mann2 that the President is considering the desirability of volunteering a press statement reiterating our position with respect to a military invasion of Cuba. Tom and I have thoroughly considered the matter, and for the reasons set forth below do not recommend that such a statement be made. However, if nevertheless the President desires to make a statement, we would recommend the following text, which has been carefully drawn from and conforms to the statements President Kennedy made in late 1962 and 1963:3

“As President Kennedy pointed out on several occasions, we do not intend to launch a military invasion of Cuba or to begin a war against Cuba. Should, however, Cuba again become a military threat to us or its neighbors, or should it carry out aggressive acts against us or other countries of the Hemisphere, then we would have an entirely different situation. Thus, peace in the Caribbean depends on the actions of the Cuban Government. This was the position of the Kennedy Administration; it is the position of this Administration.”

While the foregoing covers the two situations that might lead to armed conflict, introduction of offensive missiles, or an act of aggression against any American republic, the statement is of necessity ambiguous as to whether the phrase “aggressive acts” includes acts of the [Page 662] kind that recently took place in Venezuela. We will be on much sounder ground with respect to acts of this kind after we obtain agreement on the Venezuela resolution in the OAS.

However, the basic difficulty we see is that now to take the initiative in raising the issue of the “no invasion pledge,” at a time when it is not being pressed either by the Soviets4 or domestically, inevitably raises problems on one or both sides. To the degree that any statement appears to Khrushchev to be less than the Kennedy statements it requires a response on his part, and to the degree that any statement appears to be more than the domestic understanding of President Kennedyʼs statements it raises domestic questions of the degree to which the Administration is prepared to “co-exist” with Castro.5

U. Alexis Johnson 6
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL CUBA. Confidential.↩
  2. See Document 271.↩
  3. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Document 95, for the “assurances against the invasion of Cuba” that Kennedy gave Khrushchev in telegram 1015 to Moscow, October 27, 1962. The White House simultaneously released the text to the press. At his news conference on November 20, 1962, President Kennedy stated that “for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And as I said in September, ‘we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.’” Asked to “be a bit more specific on the scope of your no-invasion pledge” to Khrushchev, Kennedy replied that “I think if you re-read the statement you will see the position of the Government on that matter.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 831 and 832)↩
  4. In a June 16 memorandum to Rusk, Mann wrote: “There are rumors already current in Latin America and in the United States that the United States and Russia have reached some kind of accommodation on Cuba.” While Mann said that he thought this was “not an accurate description of our policy,” he argued that a “no invasion” pledge would “give currency” to the “notion of coexistence.” Mann also stated that a “no invasion” pledge “might cloud our legal right to retaliate against Castro” for shooting down a U–2 plane since Russia had already advanced the legal argument “that Castro would not be guilty of an ‘aggressive act’ as he was only defending Cuban air space.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/LA Files: Lot 66 D 65, Cuba File)↩
  5. The President did not make a “no invasion” pledge.↩
  6. Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original.↩