Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

258. Central Intelligence Agency Briefing Paper¹

Washington, April 7, 1964.

SC No. 02971/64

CUBA

I. We have seen no change since the beginning of the year in the size of the Soviet military establishment in Cuba, but the evidence continues to point to an imminent turn-over of the SA–2 surface-to-air missile system to the Cubans.

A. We believe there are still about 7,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba, making allowances for as many as 2,000 more or less.

B. The majority—perhaps as much as 80 percent—can and probably will be withdrawn when the Cubans complete their SAM training later this month.

C. An advisory and technical assistance group of perhaps one or two thousand will probably remain for some time.

II. Cubans have been conducting comprehensive air defense drills throughout the island on an almost daily basis since early February. [3½ lines of source text not declassified]

A. Cubans have already assumed control over most early warning radar functions.

B. [3½ lines of source text not declassified]

C. Some of the more sophisticated radar and communications equipment we would not expect the Soviets to turn over has been removed from the SAM sites.

D. Air defense activity conducted wholly by Soviets has been declining steadily, and [5½ lines of source text not declassified].

III. Cuban naval and ground forces have been improving their combat capabilities with more intensive and more realistic training, organizational improvements, and [1 line of source text not declassified].

A. [2½ lines of source text not declassified]

B. Cuba apparently is going to draft about 25,000 men a year for the next three years, but with simultaneous discharges, the Cuban force level of about 100,000 probably will not increase much, at least at the outset.

1. Our photography, incidentally, has recently shown the enlargement of existing barracks, and the establishment and occupation of fairly extensive tent camps with field kitchens. This probably reflects preparations to receive the draftees.

IV. Our evidence is that there may be as many as 1,500 Cubans training in bloc countries at present, suggesting that Cuba may be expecting additional Soviet military equipment soon.

A. Last month Soviet ships carrying otherwise non-military cargos brought in another six of the fast P–4 Soviet motor torpedo boats—making 12 in all—and some extra surface-to-air missiles.

B. There have been three purely military cargos delivered to Cuba this year, and a fourth is on the way, probably carrying vehicles and spare parts. One of the earlier ships brought in 12 crated MIG jet fighters, probably as replacements, which are still sitting in their crates at San Antonio de los Banos.

V. Castro himself has recently been preoccupied with economic matters and with the re-trial of Marcos Rodriguez, an old-line Communist charged with having betrayed student conspirators to the Batista police. Castro steered the second trial to center the blame on Rodriguez personally, rather than the party, thereby heading off a possible purge of the old guard Communists and putting them further in his debt.

A. The immediate economic concern is the sugar harvest now under way. Indications are the 1964 crop will be no bigger than last yearʼs 3.8 million tons—possibly less.

B. [1 line of source text not declassified] the crop is being adversely affected by labor shortages, by a somewhat lower sugar content in the cane, and by damage to the cane by the mechanical cane loaders.

C. In general, however, Cuban officials are cocky about their economic situation at present, and optimistic over prospects for improvement. You have probably read Che Guevaraʼs gloating remarks at the UN Trade and Development Conference in Geneva. The Cubans are convinced they have, as they say, “broken the back” of our economic denial effort.

D. The Cubans had a balance of about $100 million in convertible currency, largely from sugar sales, at the end of 1963. The sugar agreement Castro negotiated with the Soviet Union on his January visit makes them feel that sugar earnings will continue to increase. This confidence seems to be reflected in the credit ratings the Cubans are getting.

1. [4 lines of source text not declassified]

2. Against this background, Cuba is becoming a much more attractive market for non-bloc countries, so much so that the Cubans feel they may be in the driverʼs seat.

3. Japan used to be Castroʼs biggest single trading partner in the Free World, but last year both exports and imports fell off. Now the Cubans are telling Japanese firms that unless they trade with Cuba, Havana will feel compelled to switch the business it does in Japan to Western European firms.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, Jan–Apr 1964, Box 6, Folder 7. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Prepared for McCone to use at a White House meeting; see Document 259. McCone apparently did not use the document.