Office of the Historian

248. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson1

Washington, March 6, 1964.

We have one extremely (attached) interesting and disturbing intelligence report2 to the effect that when Castro heard about the fishing boat incident, one of the things he thought of doing was to shoot down one of our U–2 planes in retaliation. This report underlines the fact that the surface-to-air missiles in Cuba are coming increasingly under Cuban and not Russian control, and that there is therefore a need to take measures to warn Castro and his Russian friends once more on the dangers of interference with our regular high-level surveillance. I therefore suggest that you may wish to sign the attached memorandum to the Secretary of State3 asking for a diplomatic scenario aimed at strengthening our position on this matter.4

McG. B.

Attachment

Washington, March 6, 1964.

Memorandum From President Johnson to Secretary of State Rusk

Recent intelligence reports indicate that Castro may have an itchy finger on the trigger of the surface-to-air missiles in Cuba. It seems to me very important that we take every possible step to warn both the Cubans and their Soviet friends of the risk involved in any interference with our high-level surveillance. I would be glad if the Department would promptly prepare a plan for appropriate, strong, high-level warnings on this point.

Lyndon B. Johnson
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Overflights, Vol. I, 1/64–1/65. Secret.↩
  2. Not attached. On March 4 McCone sent an intelligence report to Bundy, Rusk, and McNamara that reported that Castro, in his rage over the fishing vessels incident, considered firing a missile at a U–2 plane as it overflew Cuba, but instead cut off the water supply to Guantanamo. (Ibid., Intelligence, Vol. I, 11/63–11/64)↩
  3. Not found attached; the attachment printed here is the memorandum the President signed on March 6. (Ibid., Overflights, Vol. II, 3/64–7/67)↩
  4. Johnson signed the memorandum indicating his approval.↩