Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

246. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, March 2, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Guantanamo—Reduction of Cuban Employees

1. A new batch of commuters were given notice last week. The picture now is roughly as follows:

(a) 300 “undesirables” are gone.

(b) 180 domestics have left the Base; 35 others have exiled themselves or have other jobs on the Base.

(c) 265 “goodies” are gone; 225 “goodies” have exiled themselves.

(d) In total, therefore, roughly 1000 commuters have either left the Base or have exiled themselves.

(e) 1220 commuters remain to be handled. If and when we give notice to this group, we estimate that roughly 40% will exile themselves.

2. As you may recall, about ten days ago I told DOD that we wanted the commuter reduction gently pushed through to zero.

3. A DOD contact confidentially tells me that he is skeptical that DOD will continue the reduction without a high-level push from the White House—while the Navy prepared a reduction plan at our request, Secretary McNamara appears to be holding it up. He went on to say that the Secretary has taken personal charge of the matter and may not want to carry the reduction beyond 1000 commuters—a figure which the President and he apparently agreed upon originally, at the time of the water crisis. The Secretary may be under some pressure from the Navy which argues (a) that a further reduction of commuters high-lights the erosion of our position in Guantanamo; (b) that the release of faithful employees is a tough moral, humanitarian problem, and gives Castro propaganda ammunition; and (c) that there is a practical difficulty in replacing them.

4. If the President and Secretary McNamara are on different wavelengths, you may want to bring up the issue at lunch on Tuesday.² To avoid speculation as to how the White House knows what it knows, you might bring the subject up (a) by noting the Guantanamo cable traffic which indicates that about 1000 commuters have been handled so far, and (b) by inquiring what the plans are with respect to the remaining 1200.³

5. While this is an evenly balanced case, I must say that I still favor the reduction to zero. As long as Castro can turn off or turn on the workers at will, the chances are better than even that, for one reason or another, he will tweak our nose in this respect before the year is out. And we will be faced with the same kind of head-line situation that we faced when he turned off the water.

GC

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Guantanamo General, Vol. I, 2/64–2/65. Confidential; Eyes Only.
2. March 3. This paragraph is double lined in the left-hand margin and a notation in Chaseʼs handwriting on page 1 reads “See p. 2,” referring to paragraph 4. No other record of this Tuesday luncheon has been found.
3. In an April 6 memorandum to Bundy, Chase stated that the “grapevine confidentially tells me that the President apparently gave Secretary McNamara the word on this one—i.e. that he wanted the Secretary to continue the reduction.” A notation in Bundyʼs handwriting connected by an arrow to the word “McNamara” reads “correct.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Guantanamo General, Vol. I, 2/64–2/65)