Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

220. Airgram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

A–868

Santo Domingo, December 08, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Current Political Assessment of the Dominican Republic With Short-Term and Middle-Term Outlook

REF

• SD–3410, 3658, 4001²

[Omitted here is a Table of Contents.]

SUMMARY

The Embassy estimates that unless President Balaguer is assassinated or unless there is a combination of other major negative contingencies, such as a Cuban-supported return of Caamaño or a Communist takeover in Haiti, the Constitutional Government will not face a direct and immediate threat to its survival in the short run, i.e., before the change of Administrations in the United States.

For the longer run, i.e., through June 1969, the Embassy—again assuming the absence of major negative contingencies—concludes that Balaguer will be capable of sustaining his position but with some progressive loss of authority and capacity to govern effectively. We judge it probable that Balaguer, under the pressure of many factors which are identified and analyzed in the body of this assessment, will find it necessary to announce his decision on reelection before the end of the period. We further estimate that, were he to make a decision for reelection, the fragility of the situation would increase but that, with the expected support from the military to whom he would probably be obliged to resort increasingly, he would still be able to maintain himself in power.

[Omitted here are an Introduction and sections entitled “Trends and Developments Since Last Assessment” and “Current Pressures and Present Position of Political Forces.”]

9. Outlook

A. A number of the chronic problems cited in the “Trends and Developments” section of this report will continue to plague the government during both the short and middle-term periods covered by the assessment. While a number of the “tactical” problems existing in mid-August have been handled and their potentially disturbing effects dissipated, a number of new issues have arisen or are beginning to emerge which pose longer-term implications adverse to the political health of the country. Pre-eminent among these is the election/reelection issue and the manner in which it is beginning to relate to many of the old and new sensitive political questions.

B. In the short-term period, i.e. to January 20, 1969, the usual yearend factors will play their part in adding grist to the rumor mill, creating uneasiness and disaffection in certain sectors and adding to the vague reports that circulate from a variety of sources that there is abroad a kind of anti-government psychosis of such an ill-defined character that it is impossible to pinpoint its causes or evaluate their impact or importance. Among these year-end factors are the uncertainty always caused by the possibility—and rumors of the possibility—of changes in the Cabinet and in the upper ranks of the military at the beginning of the new year, and the opportunity for agitation represented by the still unsettled issue of the Christmas bonus for government workers. These standard, even seasonal, negative political factors tending to exert short-run pressures on the government are not any greater than in previous Decembers except in the sense that this is the third year that they have operated. Moreover, their effect is balanced to some degree by the current disarray of the PRD—whose participation would be critical to any serious exploitation of the negative seasonal factors—and that partyʼs probable need for time to digest whatever decisions come out of the meeting with Bosch at Benidorm. In the short-run, therefore, and on the basis of the analysis appearing in the previous sections of this assessment, the Embassy continues to be of the opinion that there is no direct and immediate threat to the survival of the constitutional government. This short-term assessment would have to be modified should one or more of the following events occur:

(1) The return of Caamaño as the leader of a Cuban-supported attempt against the Dominican government accompanied by the simultaneous outbreak of terrorism and/or urban and rural guerrilla activity by the extreme left. The Embassy anticipates that in this event, the evidence for which is thin, the reaction of the government and the military would be prompt and at least reasonably effective and that such a development would not in and of itself topple the government.

(2) The illegal return of Wessin. In this event, and the odds are against its occurring, we estimate, the Embassy believes that the effects of such entry would be containable in the short term.

(3) The adoption by the PRD as a result of the meeting in Benidorm of an aggressively radical line calling for direct and violent action against the government through street demonstrations, strikes etc., with the cooperation of Communist elements. The Embassy believes that such a development, although manageable, would be harder to deal with than would Caamaño, but it doubts that the PRD will adopt this course and, even if it did, that it would have time to elaborate and put such a plan into operation within the six-week period of time being considered.

(4) A wave of concentrated, continuous terrorist attacks by the extreme left (perhaps abetted independently by the extreme right, for its own purposes), directed especially at the security forces. Because of the probability of strong, uncontrollable, relatively indiscriminating reactions by the security forces, a very tense situation could develop. Thus far we have no evidence of such a program, nor do we believe that the extreme left has the will or the cohesion to carry it out. If, contrary to our expectations, it were to happen, we believe that there is a better than even chance that the government would survive it in the short run.

(5) A Communist-oriented takeover in Haiti. This would create apprehension and confusion here, and, if it were accompanied by Communist terrorism or guerrilla attack on this side of the island, the consequences would be serious but still, in our estimate, manageable. (Other developments in Haiti, such as chaos following the disappearance of Duvalier, would have unsettling but less grave repercussions in the Dominican Republic.)

(6) The assassination of Balaguer. Should this occur (and the usual rumors continue) all bets would be off and an entirely new and dangerous political situation would be created.

C. It will be noted that, except in the case of the last, we estimate that any single one of the possible major “special” contingencies can be handled, although with varying degrees of difficulty, by the government. If they were to occur in combination, the survivability of the government would come into considerably more serious question.

D. Having looked at the period up to January 20, 1969 and having concluded that no direct and immediate danger of the governmentʼs overthrow exists (barring the unforeseen developments outlined immediately above), the question arises whether that same assessment is valid for the middle term, i.e. up to June 30, 1969. It is probable that some of the factors now in play or emerging will have assumed greater importance by the time that period is over. Among these are the impact of a repatriated Wessin on the political scene; a probable increase in activity on the part of certain groups of the extreme left; the increased activity of the PRD and the other opposition parties, including Garcia Godoy; the growing fatigue, literal and figurative, of the government and its chief and the consequent rise in irritation and resentment caused by inept decisions, particularly in the economic sector; and, looming over all, the election/reelection issue with its broad impact. Against these factors must be balanced the demonstrated ability of Balaguer to postpone any direct and meaningful confrontation through the utilization of a broad range of political and security measures, continuing support of the Constitutional Government by the USG, with its important economic and political/psychological effects, and the probable moderate improvement in the economy, unless external resources are denied or seriously reduced, in which case the consequences would extend well beyond the economic sector.

E. Again barring major negative contingencies of the type listed for the short-term period, the Embassy estimates that Balaguer will be capable, through June 1969, of sustaining his position but with some progressive loss of authority and capacity to govern effectively. The pressures on Balaguer to make up his mind on reelection will increase significantly, and the Embassy believes it probable that Balaguer will find it necessary to make and announce a definitive decision before June 30, 1969, not only because of the mounting clamor from the opposition but also for the sake of his own party. The effects of such a decision, the Embassy believes, would be less unsettling if Balaguer were to opt for non-reelection. Should he decide to run again, the situation would become considerably more fragile but, with the expected support of the military to whom he would probably be obliged to resort increasingly, Balaguer, we judge, would still be able to survive.

JHC

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2 DOM Crimmins and officers of the Political and Economic sections of the Embassy. Copies were sent to Madrid, Port-Au-Prince, Santiago de los Caballeros, USCINCSO for POLAD, USCINCLANT for POLAD, COMCARIBSEAFRON, and COMSECONDFLT.
2. Telegram 3410 is Document 217; telegrams 3658, September 12, and 4001, October 18, are not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2 DOM REP)