Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

212. Country Analysis and Strategy Paper¹

Santo Domingo, undated.

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Part I—Statement of Rationale and Basic Strategy

The future course of the Dominican Republic continues to be of great importance to the United States for three inter-related reasons:(a) its strategic location on our geographic doorstep and very close to Communist Cuba; (b) the primitiveness and fragility of its political, economic, social and military institutions, which make for chronic instability and consequent vulnerability to extremism; and (c) the serious damage to our interests in case of the assumption of power in another Caribbean country by forces inimical to us.

Four centuries of political, economic and social underdevelopment, thirty years of corrosive dictatorship, and six years of political turbulence and instability had by the start of the present administration produced a nation and a people uncertain of themselves and their future, erratically searching for a national identity and character while yearning for an equitable society with representative, responsive political institutions, and the economic, political, social advances and peace they associate with them. Political factors, demographic developments, economic and social inequities and proximity to Cuba have contributed to a chronic ferment on the national scene with youth perhaps the most volatile element. By mid 1968, halfway through the term in office of the Balaguer Administration, it is clear that despite modest progress, the problems of political stability, social justice, and economic development are still far from solved.

The United States has a vital interest in denying this Caribbean nation to communism including the Cuban variant. Related thereto is the necessity to prevent a regression into authoritarianism of the right, with its almost certain consequence, in the Dominican environment, of enhancing communist prospects. Any long-term success in this regard must necessarily entail far-reaching economic, social and military reforms and the creation and strengthening of indigenous institutions which today lack the capability to assure stability and progress or to strengthen the nation against domestic or foreign subversion. From the standpoint of the inter-American system, it is important that the Dominican Republic be strengthened to function as an independent, fully sovereign and responsible member of the international community.

Circumstances of geography and history—but only secondarily economics—have deeply involved the United States in developments in the Dominican Republic. Many factors favor our exercising a significant influence. The first is our very proximity, which predisposes many Dominicans to accept as inevitable a very important U.S. role. A second is the critical need for our economic and technical assistance. A third is a combination of the first two: the unusually developed tendency of many Dominicans in all walks of life to view the United States as the arbiter of their nationʼs destinies, for good or for evil. It is easy and dangerous, however, to overestimate the extent to which even a powerful nation can today work its will on a weak neighbor. The recent history of U.S. involvement in this country has emphasized certain inherent limitations on the exercise of our influence. First, there are the restraints placed on U.S. policies and actions by a decent regard for domestic and international opinion and by the ultimate ability of the Dominicans to have recourse to international organizations against real or alleged abuses of our influence. Second, the degree to which our prestige has become committed here is in itself an element which Dominicans, in and out of power, can use to resist our influence in matters in which our interests diverge because they realize the restricted alternatives we have under present circumstances. Underlying these other limitations on our influence is the basic, persistent fact of the essential primitivism of Dominican society, politics and institutions which often vitiates, distorts or frustrates our inputs, be they political, economic, social or military. Our very special importance in the Dominican Republic gives us an uncommon ability and opportunity to counsel, persuade and guide; it does not give us the power to command.

Following the revolution of April 1965, our immediate objective had to be the restoration of order in the Dominican Republic and a return to legally elected constitutional government and, with this accomplished, the maintenance of sufficient political stability and economic and social progress to enable the Government to carry out its mandate. Over the long run, we seek to promote the existence in the Dominican Republic of representative, responsive and reform-minded governments, operating from a sound economic, social and military base, friendly and disposed to cooperate with us on vital issues in international forums. In moving toward that objective, we seek a citizenry better informed about, and prepared to construct and support, democratic institutions and an equitable society based upon the rule of law and concern as well as respect for the rights of others. As an indispensable concomitant, we seek the growth, strengthening and rationalization of the Dominican economy, as well as a balance-of-payments equilibrium so that domestic and foreign resources can be most effectively utilized in a comprehensive and effective program of economic and social development and reform, which will assure meaningful and tangible progress toward the correction of prevailing inequities. Finally, we seek a small, professional, apolitical security establishment which acts as a positive, rather than, as in the past, a negative force in the political, economic and social development of the country.

Our over-all strategy to accomplish these objectives inevitably engages us in most aspects of Dominican national life. We are utilizing very substantial financial and technical assistance and encouraging appropriate domestic and foreign investment in order first to stabilize and then develop the Dominican economy along modern lines and to stimulate and accelerate social reforms. As part of this effort we are trying to raise the low average effectiveness of human resources and of the countryʼs institutions. We support and emphasize publicly and privately the concept of legal, constitutional government, the indispensability of basic economic and social changes, and the democratic process. Through material and technical assistance, training and indoctrination we work toward a security force effective, compatible with the countryʼs needs, responsive to civil authority, apolitical, and ready to perform a positive supporting role in the countryʼs progress. Finally, we employ these multiple U.S. inputs so as to persuade the Dominican Government and people to commit themselves and their own resources in a manner permitting long-run, self-sustaining economic, social and political development while avoiding resort to violence and disorder.

The broad policies which flow from this strategy are producing some progress toward our principal goals. While this progress, when measured against the situation two years ago, is encouraging, our policies cannot be said yet to have resolved any of the countryʼs basic problems. As of mid–1968, a considerable degree of political stability exists, but it is not firmly established and its continuation is far from certain. Our economic assistance has contributed to that stability, but it has had as yet little impact upon the problem of massive unemployment, and, notwithstanding some hopeful investment and production trends, it has been able to bring about only minimal economic growth and financial equilibrium. Nor has it yet produced more than modest social advances. The failure to achieve any significant per capita growth in 1967 is of serious concern, and continuation of this stagnation is unacceptable. The time has come to begin to move the DR toward the minimum target growth rate of 2.5% per capita set for the Alliance for Progress and to make it less dependent on the United States. In the FY 1970 Program Memorandum the Country Team will submit recommendations for an assistance program designed to achieve these goals. Pending consideration of these recommendations the present policy of providing only the minimum assistance needed to avoid serious balance of payments and political crisis should be continued.

[Omitted here is “Part II—Assessment of Current Situation and Near-Term Prospects” and “Part III—General and Specific Objectives.”]

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files POL 1 DOM US. Secret. Transmitted as enclosure 1 to airgram A–563, April 21, which was repeated to Santiago de los Caballeros. A covering note indicates that this paper superseded the April 15, 1967, “Country Analysis and Strategy Paper,” Document 196.