Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

168. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Koren) to the Deputy Director (Denney)¹

Washington, April 6, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Regular CIA–ARA Meeting, 6 April 1966

PARTICIPANTS

• ARA—Ambassador Gordon and Messrs. Fitzgibbons and Kubisch;² CIA—
• Messrs. Broe, Esterline and Phillips; INR/DDC—Mr. Gardner

Most of the meeting was spent on the Dominican Republic. The remainder was taken up with a discussion of the situation produced by Brazilʼs arrest of 4 Americans on smuggling charges. Mr. Kubisch, Director of the Office of Brazilian Affairs in ARA, was present during this part of the discussion only.

Dominican Republic

The exchanges on the Dominican Republic were materially enriched by the presence of Phillips, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The following emerged:

1) Gordon noted ARAʼs concurrence with Phillipsʼ point that the return from London of Caamano would be dangerous principally because of the disturbances it would provoke, and not because of the possibility that Caamano might decide to enter the election contest in some capacity. There was some talk about how Caamano might be prevented from returning, but no really helpful thought was advanced.³

2) Another pre-election poll has been run. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Gardner gathered during the discussion the poll still puts Balaguer ahead by almost the same measure as before, and that the conservative movement for National Integration (MIN) candidate, Raphael Bonnelly, had moved up from 1% to 3½%. Bonnelly is probably stronger than these figures indicate, because a substantial part of the poll in rural areas was taken before Bonnellyʼs candidacy had been announced.

3) There was concern voiced by both sides about getting out the vote. Garcia Godoy is cooperating in the effort to arouse people to vote, and there is some prospect that the cumbersome election process will be simplified, thus enhancing the prospects of substantial rural voting.

4) Phillips spoke with admiration of Bunker, saying that Bunker was for a time the only man on the island who thought the Provisional Government would make it. Bunker was in fact largely responsible for the Governmentʼs survival. Garcia Godoy is in consequence grateful to Bunker and amenable to his advice and guidance.

5) Phillips said that there had been an almost overnight cessation of terrorism and that the pause had lasted now for 5 or 6 weeks. The principal reason for the break in the series of terroristic attacks was the new chief of police, who had clamped down firmly on the rightists. Phillips pointed out that the rightists had consistently directed their attacks against the PRD; there was not one instance of an attempt against a Communist.

6) Phillips noted that during the past week there had been a marked upsurge in vocalized sentiment that Bosch was a sure winner. Gordon noted with some distaste that this might well create an important band wagon psychology for Bosch, and urged that something be done to promote countervailing assertions that Balaguer was a certain winner.

7) There was agreement that we were working with a delicate problem—giving substantial support to a candidate (Balaguer) who did not know that he was getting it.

8) Phillips said that he had no doubt that the vote would be large enough to be meaningful, and that the PRD would field a candidate. The uncertain point was whether Bosch would run himself. It was impossible to forecast who or which party would win—the polls might be accurate enough as of now, but the Dominican Republic was a never-never land and anything might happen.

9) Broe suggested, and Gordon concurred, that there should be a united effort by the members of the massive country team that we have in the Dominican Republic to keep a timely temperature chart on what was happening in the Dominican Republic, especially in regard to the elections.

10) In response to Gordonʼsʼs question, Phillips said that if Bosch were to win it would produce a very sticky situation for us, but not one as sticky as many people feared. We could live with him.

[Omitted here is brief discussion of Brazil.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Dominican Republic 1966. Secret. Drafted by James R. Gardner on April 8. Also addressed to Allan Evans, INR Deputy Director for Research.
2. Jack B. Kubisch, Director, Office of Brazil Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.
3. In an April 4 memorandum Rostow informed the President of Caamañoʼs interest in returning to the Dominican Republic and Boschʼs statement to a U.S. source that he intended to propose to the PRD that it nominate Caamaño to run for President in his place. Rostow discounted Boschʼs statement and thought the danger of Caamañoʼs running would be the “disruptive influence that it would have on the presently good and improving electoral climate.” In terms of the elections themselves, he would adversely affect Balaguerʼs chances only if he were to become Boschʼs running mate. President Johnson wrote: “Iʼd stop [Caamaño]. Donʼt let him back. L.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XIV, 1/66–4/66)