Office of the Historian

163. Memorandum for the Record1

Washington, March 12, 1966, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • At 1100, 12 March, Meeting was held in The Office of Deputy Under Secretary
  • U. Alexis Johnson to Discuss the Election Situation in the Dominican Republic

PRESENT

  • Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson
  • Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker
  • Ambassador Lincoln Gordon
  • Ambassador Henry Koren
  • Mr. Robert Sayre
  • Mr. Robert Adams
  • Mr. William Bowdler
  • Mr. William V. Broe
1.
Mr. Sayre opened the meeting with a presentation describing the political parties and entities that are or could be involved in the June election.
2.
A lengthy discussion was then held regarding U.S. Government support to Balaguer [1 line of source text not declassified]. Ambassador Gordon raised the point that Ambassador Stewart was not in favor of any U.S. participation in the election, but that he, Gordon, had read all the papers and was of the opinion we should support Balaguer. The writer reviewed the past discussions regarding U.S. Government participation including the Presidentʼs statements to the DCI and the DDCI. The writer emphasized the risk involved due to the sensitive political milieu of the Dominican Republic. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
3.
The writer raised the point that the most important basic aspects of the election were to be sure that Garcia-Godoy carried out the election in line with the Institutional Act and; secondly, the need to get out the vote, especially in the rural areas. The writer discussed the voting situation in great detail including the election carnet problem; need for use of indelible ink; lack of support to the OAS Election Commission; the personality of Angel Liz;2 need for a Dominican civic group to support the governmentʼs efforts in the election, etc. The need to put continual pressure on Garcia-Godoy was emphasized as it was quite [Page 378] evident Ambassador Bunker believes the election procedures are on track and Garcia-Godoy has the situation in hand. Ambassador Bunker advised that there would be fifty observers to supervise the actual elections.
4.
There was a detailed discussion concerning the necessity for Bosch and the PRD to participate in the election. It was agreed the most important issue was to have PRD participation in any event. It was agreed that probably Bosch could not get the PRD out of the race but a boycott by him or a partial boycott by the PRD would be highly undesirable. The writer stressed all of the unfortunate aspects of a Bosch victory to the U.S. and to the future stability of the Dominican Republic. It is interesting to note that, not in rebuttal to the above, but later in the conversation, Ambassador Bunker opined that if Bosch was elected the new military could work out a modus vivendi with him. The Ambassador also stated he believed Bosch had “learned from a previous experience” and would comport accordingly, if elected.
5.
There was a general discussion as to methods to be used to keep Bosch in the presidential race. Approaches to Venezuela, Oduber, Figueres, the Mexican Government and possibly Frei to ask them to urge Bosch to stay in the race were discussed. The writer pointed out that this was dangerous business, especially to the Venezuelans as they could get the impression we favored Bosch and pour in substantial support. Up to now, the Venezuelans had kept hands off as they have been disgusted with the Bosch/Miolan bickering. ARA will consider such approaches. Ambassador Bunker suggested that we pay Bosch to stay in the race. He felt that a sum in the neighborhood of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would suffice. Mr. Sayre and the writer opposed this. Ambassador Bunker stated that he would like to explore the feasibility of this [1 line of source text not declassified].3
6.

Deputy Under Secretary Johnson reviewed the situation and stated that, in his opinion, there were four main elements concerning the Dominican Republic election: [Page 379]

a.
Get out the vote, especially the rural vote;
b.
Participation of Bosch and the PRD in the election;4
c.
Keeping Garcia-Godoy from backsliding on holding the election in accordance with the Institutional Act; and
d.
Support to Balaguer.

He stated that he felt from the conversations that there are definite lines of endeavor either in being or proposed to push forward on the four elements and that he agreed with the current efforts and those contemplated.

William V. Broe 5
Chief Western Hemisphere Division
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 78–5505, Box 4/4, Folder 79. Secret. Drafted by Broe on March 14 and a copy was sent to the CIA Deputy Director for Plans.↩
  2. Secretary of State for Justice under the Council of State that governed the Dominican Republic from 1962 until February 27, 1963.↩
  3. In an April 7 memorandum to the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Helms clarified this issue: “I agree with you that the minutes of the 303 meeting of 28 March 1966 are somewhat unclear on the question of support to Bosch. ‘On the problem of Bosch, it was agreed that ARA would sound out the possibility of soliciting the support of other countries to keep him from pulling out.ʼ This reference overtook the previous suggestion that Ambassador Bunker would explore the possibility of getting some money to Bosch. In sum, there is no question of the United States Government clandestinely funding Boschʼs campaign.” Helms continued, “I am aware of the dangers a Bosch victory would entail, but every effort is being made to see this does not happen. There is general agreement that the best course is to have Bosch run initially, and if he withdraws with a cry of fraud, there is nothing that can be done about it.” No record of the March 28 303 Committee meeting has been found. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic, Folder 302)↩
  4. At this point the following handwritten notation appears on the right margin: “Not too important in my view.”↩
  5. Printed from a copy that indicates Broe signed the original.↩