147. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Koren) to the Director (Hughes)1
SUBJECT
- ARA-Agency Meeting December 8, 1965
PARTICIPANTS
- ARA-Mr. Sayre, Ambassador Stewart, Mr. [Charles H.] Thomas
- CIA-Mr. Broe, Mr. Phillips, [name not declassified]
- INR/DDC-Mr. Gardner
Dominican Republic
Phillips [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and who is back in Washington for three daysʼ consultation, gave a run-down of the situation in the Republic. With Garcia Godoy, he said, we have come full circle. We originally had supported him to lead the Provisional Government, then had become gravely concerned over the nature of his appointments, and now had become convinced once more that out of the entire field he was the only man who possibly could have done the job. The key here lay in Garcia Godoyʼs having rid the government of Attorney General Cerda.2 This man had to be the first to go and now that he in fact was gone the future looked considerably brighter.
Phillips said there now were solid grounds for confidence that the Provisional Government would last and that there would be elections as scheduled. The broad underlying question now is: will both parties, i.e., Bosch and Balaguer, run—or will the PRD boycott the elections? Bosch has already hinted that he will not stand for election if the IAPF is still present, and that there is no use in his running anyway because the Pentagon would never let him take office. If Bosch did refuse to run it would make things very bad for us.
In reply to Sayreʼs question, Phillips said that he did not believe that the Dominican military would let Bosch hold office for more than a week. In response to Gardnerʼs question, Sayre said that it would be bad if Bosch refused to run, but it would be worse if he did, won, and then got tossed out.
[Page 350]Later in the meeting there were murmurings about the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] poll in the Dominican Republic. I gathered the results thus far indicate that Bosch stands no chance at all. According to these same murmurings, 64% of the Dominican Republic thinks it a good idea that the US troops came in. This percentage seems unreal; it is possible that it refers only to rural vote. Gardner did not press for clarification [3 lines of source text not declassified].
The discussion then turned to the quality of the Dominican security forces. Phillips said that police morale had not been good but that Cerdaʼs removal had brought on almost immediate transformation. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] interest in the police lay in having them a) become an effective intelligence-gathering outfit and b) evolve an effective rural program with good and rapid lateral and vertical communications. The officers of the new rural police force have all been chosen and are undergoing training, as have 85% of the enlisted personnel. The training is emphasizing civic action and public relations, and an excellent augury for the future is the enthusiasm which the police command itself is showing for the program.
As far as urban riot control capability is concerned, there is some distance yet to travel. The former riot control organization had been of first-class quality, but most of its personnel had been liquidated during the troubles. Training was going ahead, but essential equipment was slow in arriving from the United States. The fault here, both Phillips and Broe indicated, lay with AID Washington.3
The DNI (National Intelligence Service) was starting from scratch, but there were grounds for confidence. It had a good leader, and furthermore Garcia Godoy was its firm supporter because of the very good and accurate information it had given him on the recent rightist uprising in Santiago.
In sum, it looked as if the Dominican security forces would be able to keep control of the situation when the IAPF pulled out. It was almost sure that there will be some re-action from the Communist Party if Balaguer wins the election, but it presumably can be contained.
Arms collection: Phillips said that the potentials of the buying-up phase had been about exhausted; [3 lines of source text not declassified]
[Omitted here are sections on Mexico, Costa Rica, and Venezuela.]
- Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, 303 Committee Files, Subject File, Dominican Republic 1965. Secret. Drafted on December 9 by James R. Gardner. The memorandum was also addressed to the Deputy Director for Research Allan Evans.↩
- Godoy removed Manuel Morel Cerda as the Attorney General on November 17.↩
- At this point the words “with AID” are underlined and “To be expected of CIA!” was handwritten in the margin.↩