Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

138. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Santo Domingo, October 14, 1965.

PARTICIPANTS

• President Hector Garcia Godoy
• Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker
• Harry W. Shlaudeman, ARA/CAR

Ambassador Bunker called on President Garcia Godoy to pay his respects before leaving and to discuss the following matters of interest:

(1) Ambassador Bunker suggested that the time has now come for the Provisional Government “to redress the balance.” The impression is widespread both in the Dominican Republic and abroad that the Constitutionalists and their extremist allies have had all the best of it since the installation of the new government. Concessions to the rebels were obviously necessary as long as their zone remained intact but, with that problem now resolved, it should be possible for Garcia Godoy to make it clear that his administration will be impartial and free of extremist influence. Ambassador Bunker pointed out that the Provisional Governmentʼs unfavorable image resulted in large part from a few specific situations: i.e., the appointment of Morel Cerda as Attorney General, the presence of Franklyn Dominguez in a key position in the National Palace, the strong MPD influence in the immigration service at the airport, and the extremist, pro-rebel line being followed by the government-owned Radio Santo Domingo and La Nacion.

(2) President Garcia Godoy said he was fully aware of the doubts raised by certain of his appointments and by other concessions he had made to the Constitutionalists. However, he strongly believed that his conciliatory strategy and the moves resulting from it had been absolutely correct. For example, the appointment of Domingo de la Mota as Director of Sports was open to justifiable criticism on political grounds but de la Mota took 300 men with him out of the rebel zone and kept them out. Similarly, the new governor of Puerto Plata—a Constitutionalist—persuaded two commandos of men from his region to leave and return home. Garcia Godoy said he gave people in this category jobs only to help restore peace and that some of those involved were aware of his purpose and expected to be replaced in time.

(3) Regarding the specific situations mentioned by Ambassador Bunker, Garcia Godoy said he intended to handle the airport immigration situation by undertaking a complete reorganization of services at the airport. Radio Santo Domingo presently infested by several hundred undesirable and/or useless employees would also be reorganized. The government would shut down La Nacion, putting its presses to work printing low-priced school textbooks. Garcia Godoy also stated that he planned to move Dominguez out of his present sensitive position in the Palace.

(4) Ambassador Bunker suggested as a further step in the effort to improve the governmentʼs image that Garcia Godoy take advantage of the reunification of Santo Domingo to issue a strong public statement calling for maintenance of law and order throughout the country. Garcia Godoy said he was planning to make a speech within the next few days in which he would stress this aspect of the situation. Ambassador Bunker also suggested that it would be desirable for the government to reassure the country regarding its intention to hold elections on schedule. Garcia Godoy agreed and said he intended in the near future to call in all the political leaders for consultations on the composition of the Central Electoral Board and other questions relating to the elections.

(5) Ambassador Bunker expressed the opinion that Garcia Godoy should pay careful attention to the problem of his relations with the military high command. Maintaining good communications with Rivera Caminero and the chiefs should be a matter of principal concern to the President. Ambassador Bunker thought relations had improved in that quarter recently and urged Garcia Godoy to make every effort to keep them good.

(6) Garcia Godoy, returning to the problem of his governmentʼs image, said he hoped the doubts raised by his handling of the Constitutionalists would not prevent the United States from providing the generous assistance his government so badly needs. It was his impression that the amount of aid required had been seriously underestimated. Imbertʼs regime issues $19–20 million of checks covering payroll and other expenses in July and August for which funds were not available. The Provisional Government was forced to come up with this money. Now, additional assistance over and above the $20 million grant would be needed.

(7) Ambassador Bunker replied that he had not been aware of the large shortfall left by the Imbert regime. He said we realized more assistance would be needed and were prepared to treat the Provisional Governmentʼs requests sympathetically. Ambassador Bunker reminded Garcia Godoy of the Provisional Governmentʼs commitment to provide $10 million to the recovery program from its own resources. He emphasized the importance of meeting this obligation. He also asked that Foreign Minister-designate Rodriguez be informed of the facts regarding United States assistance. Rodriguez recently approached officers of our United Nations Mission with the complaint that the United States had given “nothing.”

Mr. Shlaudeman expressed the hope that the Provisional Government would make every effort to furnish balance of payment, budgetary and other financial data requested by the Embassy, AID and the OAS. Comprehensive information would help speed consideration of requests for additional assistance.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 DOM REP. Confidential. Drafted by Shlaudeman. The meeting was held in the National Palace.