Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

123. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, August 12, 1965, 0440Z.

416. From Bunker. Committeeʼs meeting with Caamano group this afternoon brought negotiations down to what has always been gut issue here: makeup of armed forces high command. We came away with impression that other problems could be handled. Objections to Article 4² might well be worked out through memorandum of understanding or protocol re procedures for dismantling and disarming constitutionalist zone. Also, in our opinion, Article 8³ difficulties (i.e. future of various types of constitutionalist military) are susceptible to treatment through some kind of compromise formula, perhaps involving a special board to review individual cases of officers involved. Article 10⁴ was not even mentioned.

On other hand, it is difficult see where immediate solution to problem of armed forcesʼ leadership might lie. Caamanoʼs group made the point very clearly. (Up to now they have been avoiding issue but our proposal and public declaration has forced it into open.) Aristy and Jorge Blanco insisted that Provisional Government could not be installed with Rivers, de los Santos, Martinez Arana and Wessin still at their posts. I pointed out that constitutionalists had previously agreed leave all such matters to Provisional President and said that Garcia Godoy, who is fully aware of problem, could be trusted to work out satisfactory solution. They, however, firmly maintained their position.

Tonight we again discussed situation with Garcia Godoy. He is most reluctant go ahead without at least minimal agreement on part of rebels. Does not believe that provisional government could function (or even be formed, given timidity of his potential colleagues) without rebel acceptance. He also shares our impression that Imbert is only prepared to sign “act of reconciliation” if other side also signs and if four points put forward by armed forces (Embtel 405)⁵ are explicitly understood to be binding. Nevertheless, Garcia Godoy did say that he would be prepared go ahead and take office without final agreement if rebels (and presumably armed forces) would agree to installation under such condition. He urged, however, that we first make determined effort persuade Caamano and company accept our proposal as it stands.

We intend make this effort. First step will be private approach to Guzman tomorrow morning in effort use him to enlist Boschʼs aid. Emphasis will be on fact that this may well be last chance for solution favorable to PRD electoral ambitions and that party will ultimately lose if Aristy and extremists are allowed continue insist on impossible conditions. Garcia Godoy plans talk to Jorge Blanco in same vein. After these soundings have been made we will decide on strategy for next meeting with Caamano group, probably to take place tomorrow afternoon. Will keep Department informed as we go along.

Re suggestions in Deptel 216,⁶ I agree that we must continue efforts persuade Garcia Godoy take over without firm agreements on all outstanding issues. It is clear, however, that he will not assume office solely on basis GNR acceptance of “act of reconciliation”. It also clear, in my opinion, that he would not be prepared—at least at outset—to acquiesce in use of coercive measures such as sealing off rebel zone. I think best we can hope for is that he would take over on basis simple agreement of both sides that he do so, with negotiations for final settlement to continue thereafter.

Time frame is still difficult predict but it seems likely at least a few more days will be necessary to complete our efforts. We are very conscious of risk that delay will give Imbert an opportunity back away from his commitment. We are also aware that with self-serving politicians now rising to the attack, Garcia Godoyʼs candidacy is in jeopardy. Nevertheless, I believe we must continue along line we have set.

Foregoing may be repeated to AmEmbassy Rio at Departmentʼs discretion.

Bennett

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 6 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.
2. The final version of Article 4 reads: “The provisional vice president of the Republic, who shall have under his direction one of the ministries, shall take the place of the provisional president in case of his temporary or permanent absence. The vice president shall be chosen from among the members of the cabinet, upon nomination of the president, through the affirmative vote of the two thirds of the cabinet. In case of the permanent absence of the provisional president, and in case the provisional vice president is also temporarily or permanently absent, the duties of provisional president of the Republic shall be discharged by the following persons in this order: The presiding judge of the supreme court of justice; the deputy presiding judge of the supreme court of justice, and then the other judges of that court in descending order of age.” (The OAS Chronicle, October, 1965, p. 26)
3. The final version of Article 8 reads: “The national district and the municipalities of the Republic shall be governed by the provisions of Title X of the 1963 Constitution, which is based on the corresponding provisions of the 1962 Constitution, except that the council chairmen, mayors, and councillors of the municipal governments shall be appointed and may be removed from office by the provisional president of the Republic. Likewise, the provisional government shall be governed by the provisions of Title XI of the said Constitution.” (Ibid., p. 26)
4. The final version of Article 10 reads: “The provisional government shall in no way jeopardize the sovereignty of the Republic nor in any way alienate the property of the state.” (Ibid., p. 26)
5. Telegram 405 from Bunker in Santo Domingo, August 10, lists the Armed Forcesʼ four points: “1. All military who are abroad and who deserted shall remain outside of armed forces; 2. All officials who rebelled and who meet retirement age and conditions will be retired with pensions; 3. All rebel officers who in judgment chiefs of staff may constitute danger or may be in personal danger will be designated to post abroad; and, 4. Decisions of retirement board in accordance with organic law of Armed Forces, will be maintained as well as decisions of competent tribunals.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65–9/65)
6. Document 122.