Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

118. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, August 2, 1965, 0321Z.

311. From Bunker, Bennett and Palmer. Ref Deptel 165.² Dept please pass CINCLANT from Palmer.

I. Following are answers to questions posed Deptel 165 under three stated hypotheses:

A. PG Installed with Agreement Caamano

1. This is of course assumption which OAS committee has been going on all along; it is extremely difficult to envisage how PG could be established, except by imposition, unless this assumption is fulfilled. Certainly it could not be under proposed leadership of Garcia Godoy who has made his acceptance office contingent on Caamanoʼs agreement.

2. Once Caamano agrees to installation PG, many rebels who are opposed to OAS formula will nonetheless decline to fight to prevent it from being carried out. Probably, however, there will remain some sporadic resistance by hard core extremists. It is doubtful that such resistance will be grouped in major geographical concentrations.

3. We doubt that administrative measures, if unaccompanied by use of military force, would provide appropriate means for reducing any resistance remaining. Since such resistance is likely to be scattered rather than concentrated, administrative measures would be difficult to apply. Moreover, even if it proved possible to discriminate, such measures would be slow and insufficient, given considerable stocks of food and other supplies still available in rebel zone. If area or areas holding out contained important economic assets, such as commercial banks, delay would inhibit countryʼs return to normalcy.

4. Military action would probably be required to overcome sporadic resistance of hard core of rebels who refuse to accept any agreement which fails to include their demands. In any event, these actions must be accomplished: positive turn-in of arms; positive check of critical facilities for mines, booby traps, etc. provision of normal police protection—traffic control; prevention of crime; protection of citizens and their property; security of public buildings and utilities. Restoration of utilities. Fire prevention and protection. Clean-up garbage and trash.

5. If significant pockets of rebel resistance should remain, these could be subjected to psyops and selective denial measures, including, if feasible, administrative ones. But these efforts would be supplementary and designed not to substitute for military force but to minimize need for its use.

6. It is possible that, if some rebels continued to resist after Caamano had agreed to PG, Caamano himself might take action against them. Indeed he himself has said as much. In such case, we believe it would be desirable for IAPF to remain outside rebel zone for reasonable time to allow him to establish control over his forces. In event he unable to do so, or is held up for unreasonable time, then IAPF should move in to ensure that job is done.

7. Any pacification which may be required beyond what Caamano himself undertakes should be done only by IAPF. Use of regular DomRep forces and/or national police would only exacerbate hatreds and harden resistance. Combined operation would have same disadvantages.OAS committee contemplates that upon installation of PG present ISZ would be extended to include rebel zone. Thus it appropriate that order should be established and initially maintained there by IAPF. Later, after IAPF forces had been in area for some time, joint IAPF–national police patrols could be used, with eventually national police taking over entirely.

B. PG Installed Without Caamanoʼs Approval

1. As stated above, this hypothesis is difficult to envisage under present circumstances. In event it should become reality, force would have to be applied by IAPF to degree necessary to restore order and unite capital under PG. Appropriate psyops, designed to weaken popular support of rebel forces, should be conducted in connection with denial measures which, under this hypothesis, would be feasible. Military operations should then be initiated, exact nature and scope depending in part on results of first psychological and denial phase. For example, if only light resistance were expected and encountered, operations should be conducted rapidly to clear rebel zone in its entirety. On other hand, if as events developed heavy resistance were expected and met, operations could be conducted by phases with appropriate psyops and denial measures conducted in between phases.

C. PG Installed Without Imbert Approval

1. We believe provisional government could be installed without Imbert, although this would probably require that present Minister of Defense, military chiefs of staff and Chief of national police be retained (in view probability their cooperation would be necessary in removing Imbert). Without support of armed forces and police, no provisional government could govern, unless US and/or OAS are prepared introduce military forces on massive scale.

2. Lack of Imbertʼs approval would not basically affect actions required in rebel zone as described in section A this message. As practical matter GNR could not continue to exist if Imbert deprived of support of chiefs of staff.

[Omitted here is a detailed estimate of the military strength of both sides: the Embassy estimated that Caamanoʼs forces totaled 1,000 and Imbertʼs totaled 11,500.]

Bennett

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to DOD, CIA, and the White House.
2. Document 116.