Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

112. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, June 27, 1965, 1216Z.

2628. From Bunker. Committee has now completed its round of talks with civic and political leaders. Responses to our proposal from both sides are on record and we have had opportunity test reactions among wide range of other groups and individuals. Believe we can gauge current situation and future prospects in following terms.

1. Committeeʼs proposal in its essential elements still appears best available solution. Number of objections have been raised to single election and brief pre-electoral period but no consensus has emerged on alternatives. Furthermore, firm commitment to early elections is feature which obviously has greatest appeal to rebels, their supporters and, we believe, to country at large. Belief that elections will be held also promises be major factor in persuading at least a significant number of rebels to go along with peaceful solution. As result our talks I propose add following refinements: (a) election date will be set full nine months from date provisional government takes office; and (b) campaign period will be restricted to last three months, with six months of complete political truce preceding.

2. I believe we must have solution here soonest. Country cannot support current situation much longer. I propose exert every effort push our proposed solution through next week.

3. Major difficulty we face at moment is attitude of Imbert and his supporters in GNR. He feels his pride is at stake and fears becoming object of ridicule if he were to step down now after, as everyone knows, we asked him to take the job in the first place. Appeals to reason and patriotism have so far failed and, while we should make preparations recommended Embtel 2617,² it seems likely considerable pressure will have to be used to get him out. Imbert is reinforced by hard-liners (including a few members of U.S. press corps) who insist that only “military solution” is adequate to meet Communist threat, and by various opportunists who see personal advantages in his remaining in office.

4. Attitude of military represents key factor in Imbert problem. I am encouraged by Penna Marinhoʼs talk with De Los Santos and Wessin and by reports from Embassy Attachés that armed forcesʼ leaders may be prepared accept a new provisional government. I am hopeful that this will prove case and that, once presented with firm proposal for interim government including names, they will exert pressure on Imbert to step down. I feel, however, that we have to be cautious in assessing this prospect. Military chiefs are as anxious as Imbert for a solution by force. They may also fear that his removal could open way for their own. These factors, along with increasing sense of frustration engendered by developments such as yesterdayʼs incident in San Francisco,³ might in end make them strongly resistant to any compromise solution.

In this regard, Ambassador Bennett and I are aware of and fully share Dept.ʼs view that restructuring of military establishment here is absolutely essential. However, I do not see much hope for radical changes in armed forcesʼ leadership in near future if we are to have early solution. We need support of top military if solution is to be achieved and they, in turn, will require reassurances from US. Ambassador Bennett and I do anticipate that Wessinʼs early removal will prove possible. Other changes will probably have to come more gradually. I am confident we will be able to use our influence and work closely with provisional government to accomplish this objective.

5. Major leverage with Imbert and military lies in GNRʼs virtually complete dependence on our financial assistance. I hesitate to use it and will not unless absolutely necessary. However, if by next Tuesday night⁴ Imbert and company are not prepared step aside, I would propose inform him and military that no further aid for payment wages and salaries will be forthcoming. As I understand it, money for next round will not be available until Monday. We could easily hold off for two days, except perhaps for direct payments to municipalities which might be advantageous. I repeat hope use of this club will not be necessary. Explanation of facts of life to the military may be enough turn trick if Imbert continues adamant.

6. On Constitutionalist side there are also number of problems. Caamano and company still resisting on Communist issue, asking no-deportation guarantee, right of 14th of June to legal recognition and full range of public liberties without adequate provision to deal with subversion. Problem of constitutionalist military is also troublesome, as is proposal that Congress should pass on institutional act. However, I believe these can be effectively dealt with once satisfactory provisional government is at hand. We have impression large number in rebel camp are extremely anxious for solution and not prepared accompany Communists in self-immolation. Their major fear is that giving up fight would expose them to reprisals and repression. Provisional government headed by man in whom they have confidence plus firm assurance of elections should persuade these more moderate elements that time has come to end the struggle. Under these circumstances I would look forward to disintegration of movement at early date, even if rebel leaders for some reason should refuse to go along with our proposal at last minute.

7. Prospects for pushing through solution obviously depend on our ability come up with satisfactory provisional government. There is surprisingly broad consensus here that new regime should be presidential, not collegiate in form. My colleagues and I agree. We have also about come to conclusion that Hector Garcia Godoy is best man available to head provisional government. He has broad support (Santiago group, Balagueristas and numerous independents); he is at least more acceptable than most to rebels; he is a good friend of ours; he is willing to serve and appears quite capable to us. As previously reported, we have asked Garcia to take appropriate soundings and come back Monday for specific discussions.

8. If Garcia returns with satisfactory answers I would propose push ahead in effort establish his provisional government during course of next week. Before doing so I would, of course, obtain firm commitments from him on handling of Communist problem. I anticipate no difficulties that regard.

Will appreciate your comments and instructions.

Ambassador Bennett concurs.

Bennett

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, White House Cables, 4/65–7/65. Secret; Exdis.
2. In telegram 2617 from Santo Domingo, June 26, Bennett stated that he and Bunker believed the United States should encourage Imbert to “retire gracefully” in order to make way for a “moderate, middle-road provisional government.” If Imbert stepped down, they recommended that the United States make several “gestures” that would boost Imbertʼs ego and demonstrate U.S. appreciation for his “service to non-Communist cause” during the past months of intense negotiations. Recommended were: a statement by President Johnson calling attention to Imbertʼs patriotic role; award Imbert the Legion of Merit or other decoration; and an invitation to visit with President Johnson in Washington. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP)
3. According to telegrams 2613 and 2619 from Santo Domingo, both dated June 26, at approximately 4 a.m. an armed band of civilians with Communist involvement attacked the police headquarters, the army post, and a small police post in the city of San Francisco de Macoris. No clear reason for this uprising was cited other than it possibly being an effort to mount further violence in another part of island. The Constitutionalists suffered 8 dead and 30 wounded (1 GNR soldier wounded) before the Armed Forces brought the incident under control. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. VIII)
4. June 29.