Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

106. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, June 14, 1965, 0430Z.

2405. Ref: Deptel 1427.² From Bunker. I appreciate helpful reftel and wish offer further clarification of my current thinking.

1. As I see it: A) Neither side will negotiate with nor make any meaningful concessions to the other. B) Solution through mediation therefore not now possible. C) Resumption of fighting and solution through force of arms is unacceptable. D) OAS must therefore act independently to develop formula that will meet basic aspirations of Dom people, while satisfying responsible international opinion. E) An equitable solution proposed and strongly supported by the OAS should attract popular support and international acceptance to extent that ultimately only hardcore extremists would refuse go along.

2. A solution firmly based on free and honest elections open to all would seem to have best chance of success. Lack of identifiable national consensus makes it difficult for OAS to sponsor formula based on delivering power for any significant period of time to any particular individuals or groups, no matter how apparently apolitical they might be. On the other hand, OAS is in strong position to propose an electoral solution. It can draw on precedent of 1962 elections in making claim to possessing capability and prestige necessary to organize and guarantee genuinely free elections. It can insist with absolute impartiality that only equitable solution lies in exercise of peopleʼs fundamental right to choose their own government.

3. I believe initial emphasis in committeeʼs proposals should therefore be on elections. Agree that satisfactory interim govt is high priority but believe groundwork can best be laid by obtaining widest possible understanding and agreement that basic solution will be reached through elections. Fear attempt push ahead and create yet another provisional govt without first establishing this principle would embroil committee in same disputes over personalities and politics that have plagued previous efforts in that direction.

4. In my judgment OAS proposal for elections must be highly specific to be credible. Plan should emphasize major role of OAS and IAPF in setting up machinery and creating proper climate for holding genuinely free elections. Preparations, such as establishment of new OAS electoral commission, should get under way soonest. Above all, proposal must envisage completion of electoral process within time span sufficiently short to convince Dom political groups and people as a whole that this is not just another scheme to postpone the day of reckoning indefinitely. In my judgment this means an electoral date set between six and nine months from now. Anything further off would, I fear, fail inspire confidence among Doms who are inclined to suspect that any provisional government will want to become entrenched.

5. In putting forward this proposal for elections, committee would at same time stress importance immediate establishment provisional government for interim period. To provide interim govt with necessary legal authority, and in order hold constitutional issue in abeyance, committee has been thinking of an “institutional act” spelling out governmental administrative prerogatives and functions. Drafting of such a document would not be overly difficult given substantial areas of agreement in this field between 1962 and 1963 constitutions. We would anticipate committee asking group of prominent Dom lawyers to sit down with OAS legal experts in order work out details. Deptʼs promised draft of “basic law” should be most helpful that regard.

6. Given foregoing assumptions, OAS can well take position that interim govt should logically be apolitical in character, with emphasis on technical capacity. As matter of procedure, committee could first ask broadly representative group of Doms to meet with them and work out composition of caretaker regime. My colleagues and I have been collecting suitable names and should be prepared issue invitations just as soon as OAS electoral plan is on the table.

7. In terms of timing, I would hope to have agreement of my colleagues on essential elements of plan by next Wednesday³ or Thursday; to lay it before Imbert, Caamano, and public in general the next day; to finish up necessary missionary work among various Dom groups soon as possible thereafter; and to commence promptly negotiations on interim govt. If all goes well we might be on the road to elections with an acceptable interim govt in office by end of month.

8. My prognosis is that resistance to plan will be strong from both sides. We can expect Caamano and company to reject it out of hand. However, emphasis on elections as only fair and practical way out of impasse should result in gradual erosion of domestic and internal support for their position. Goal would be to reduce group in large measures to hard-core extremists. I see no alternative but to go ahead on assumption moderates in rebel camp will come around sooner or later.

9. Imbert and his hard-line following can also be expected to make considerable trouble. Zellerʼs speech yesterday (Embtel 2378)⁴ makes it clear they mean to insist that GNR must stay in office until an elected government is installed. Extremely strong pressure will be required to break this position and I am not completely confident at this point that Ambs Penna Marinho and Clairmont Duenas are prepared to go along with the rough tactics we will probably need to employ, since they seem to have become increasingly impressed by Imbert and his approach to free elections. I plan explore this problem further with them.

10. In conclusion I would like to stress one point which appears to me fundamental. We cannot expect to manage the outcome of this affair as we might like. Attitudes and prejudices of my OAS colleagues, to say nothing of numerous other factors outside our control, will play too large a part. Best we can do—and we mean to do it—is assure that solution meets basic requirements of the national interest.

Next following cable⁵ contains comments on specific points raised in reftel.

Bennett

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate;Exdis. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.
2. Document 105.
3. June 23.
4. In telegram 2378 from Santo Domingo, June 12, Bennett reported that in Zeller Coccoʼs speech he indicated “renewed indications of GNR frustration,” principally that of GNRʼs “forced inability attack rebel stronghold” “which is shielded by foreign ‘Cordon Sanitaire.’” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP)
5. Document 107.