Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

103. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, June 10, 1965, 1630Z.

2323. For Secretary from Bunker.

1. USUN telegram 4931² to Dept, rpt info Santo Domingo 73, raises fundamental considerations affecting outcome of my efforts here on which I want you to have my personal views.

2. I am convinced after intensive investigation on the scene during past week that political formula which would meet our requirements, be acceptable to Caamano/Bosch group, and at same time attract support of other key elements of Dominican body politic (e.g. church, armed forces, civic and professional organizations, business groups, and, I suspect, a not inconsiderable number of common people, particularly in rural areas, who long for peace and stability) is virtually impossible to achieve.

3. I have reached conclusion that about only way to break present political impasse here and restore a measure of harmony is to let people decide for themselves through free and open elections supervised by OAS and the formation in the meantime of a provisional government of technicians who, governing under an institutional act with strong OAS support, could take country to elections. This formula should attract broad popular support in DomRep and international acceptance. I am working in this direction in Ad Hoc committee³ and I am hopeful that my Brazilian and Salvadorean colleagues will accept this formula.

4. Our prognosis is that electoral formula as I conceive it will not be acceptable to either Caamano or Imbert and that opposition of former will probably be stronger than that of latter, making it necessary for us to proceed without Caamano/Bosch consent and very possibly against their determined, active opposition.

5. Returning to USUNʼs cable, foregoing prospect raises in my opinion need to begin planning now how we can best deal with pressure for additional UN involvement anticipated in USUNʼs message. I recognize that given attitudes in UNSC this not easy assignment. Task of putting through electoral-provisional government-institutional act formula is going to be difficult enough without increased UN involvement here. This particularly true when involvement is in hands of a representative like Mayobre who is so clearly inclined toward camp which is likely to oppose our peacekeeping efforts most vigorously, with possible renewal of the hostilities and/or widespread demonstrations and protests which USUN says will immediately trigger pressure for greater UN intervention.

6. I trust that every effort will be made with sympathetic governments on UNSC, as well as with UN-SYG, to keep UN involvement from going beyond already uncomfortable level.

Bennett

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.
2. In telegram 4931 from USUN, June 9, Stevenson warned that the United States should not “cherish illusion that danger of further SC intervention is past or that those publicly or privately favoring greater UN role, including SYG himself, have been persuaded to contrary or permanently silenced.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. VII) The United States believed that Caamañoʼs group had resisted compromise efforts with the OAS Ad Hoc Committee because of encouragement it had received from Mayobre who had sought an expansion of his mandate to intervene in the Dominican crisis. (Telegram 2232 from Santo Domingo, June 4; ibid., and telegram 1373 to Santo Domingo, June 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP)
3. On June 2 a resolution establishing an Ad Hoc Committee, composed of Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho of Brazil, Ambassador Ramon de Clairmont Duenas of El Salvador, and Ambassador Bunker of the United States, was adopted at the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics in Washington. This committee was to continue the efforts of the OAS Special Committee to help find a solution to the Dominican crisis, to guide the Inter-American Peace Force, and to report to the Tenth Meeting as events arose in the Republic.