Office of the Historian

22. Memorandum From Robert M. Sayre of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

Washington, July 23, 1964.

At the OAS meeting this morning, Argentina came out strongly against Cuba, but at the same time said that the action taken should [Page 62] be a matter of conviction with each American Republic. The Foreign Minister said Argentina had already resolved what it would do—it has broken relations, etc., but did not want to vote a resolution that would give other countries troubles. How Argentina will come out is hard to say; its position this morning was not helpful. The military members of the Argentine delegation are most unhappy with their Government’s position. State’s Director Argentine Affairs2 continues of the view that the Argentine Government will have to get in line or face the prospect of being tossed out by the military as it was in 1962, when it failed to agree at Punta del Este.

Haiti said it would vote with the majority on sanctions, but a double-cross is possible. The Haitian Foreign Office put the heat on Ambassador Timmons to get approval of an export license for T–28’s in the same conversation about Haiti’s support on Cuba.

Brazil is working with our delegation, and is ready to go down the line with us. Counting Haiti, there are 13 votes lined up with us. Rusk discussed with the President at lunch, a telegram to President Paz to get Paz to instruct his Foreign Minister to vote with us.3 Peru says it will vote with the majority, but it is also still talking like Argentina.

Chile, Mexico and Uruguay are opposed to sanctions, and unlikely to change their minds.

RMS
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, OAS Resolution, Vol. V (9th MFM), 7/64–8/64. Confidential.↩
  2. Henry A. Hoyt.↩
  3. Although no substantive record of this discussion has been found, the President approved the telegram to Paz. (Telegram 49 to La Paz, July 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 VEN) Rusk also called Ambassador to Bolivia Douglas Henderson to emphasize the importance of Bolivia’s vote: “Sec asked what time he [Henderson] would see Pres Paz and Henderson said 4:15. Sec asked him to do his very best; this could make quite a lot of difference. Sec said we could get very good result if Henderson was successful. Sec. asked the Amb to phone us after his interview.” (Rusk to Henderson, July 24, 2:50 p.m.; ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls 7/1/64–8/5/64) No record of a return call from Henderson has been found. The subsequent reply from Paz was non-committal. (Telegram 121 from La Paz, July 25; ibid., Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 VEN)↩