Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico

190. Telegram From the Department of State to the Ambassador to Brazil (Gordon)¹

Washington, March 28, 1964.

1. Steps being taken to provide tanker service for POL requirements as estimated here. Our estimate based on 30 day supply MO gas for Sao Paulo forces for both combat and movement as far as Rio or Porto Alegre, AV gas for 40 squadron 1½ hour sorties, and navy special and diesel fuel for 30 days. Hope to advise you fully of detailed implementation within few days.

2. Exploring with other agencies additional courses of action recommended in your report but awaiting word from you on logistic support required. In this connection, while not desirous of disrupting needed contacts or normal ARMA activities, hope you and ARMA or other key staff can avoid direct contact with military plotters. Leave to your judgment but suggest that [2 lines of source text not declassified].

3. To what purposes would armaments offloaded from submarine be put? How critical would small shipment this kind be to success of main military thrust? Questions also arise here about feasibility furnishing unmarked or non-US origin arms without these later being attributed to US covert operation.

4. Would not Brazilian military be able to provide military protection in Sao Paulo–Santos areas for logistic support? If so, why is there any need for stand-by US naval units or follow-up military participation? Doubtful we can provide plausible cover for naval operation.

5. Would appreciate more detail on status of Castello Branco operation and on estimated alignment and relative effectiveness, actual or potential, of officers and key elements in the four armies and other armed forces; also degree likelihood various possible Goulart actions which would trigger their resistance. To what extent would such estimates be affected by (a) Congressional support or non-support (b) differing degrees gubernatorial action?

6. Reply to your query on coffee tax or blocking coffee receipts in preparation and will advise by April 1. How does your assessment affect debt negotiations? Should we abandon, slow down or otherwise modify debt negotiating strategy to avoid strengthening Goulart’s prestige? Should we hold up approval or announcement of AID loans? Are other non-military measures desirable further to polarize situation to Goulart’s disadvantage?

7. Statement by President or Secretary not believed desirable at this time.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. II, 3/64. Top Secret. Drafted by Adams and Burton. Printed from a draft copy of the telegram. A typewritten note indicates that it was “cleared in substance at a White House meeting.”