Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

37. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland¹

Washington, July 23, 1964, 6:54 p.m.

160. Cabot-Wang Talks: 121 Meeting Guidance. Following guidance is provisional and not fully cleared. It is provided to permit you to begin to organize your presentation. Changes or confirmation will follow.

FYI: ChiComs in June held major party meeting and apparently consulted with North Vietnamese and other friends. Result has been deeper ChiCom commitment to come to assistance North Viet-Nam if attacked. (See July 9 People’s Daily Editorial.) While ChiComs thus more committed to meet major US attack, they have avoided committing selves to explicit action in response US actions at lower level. We presume they will reiterate threats contained July 9 editorial. We are particularly interested to see whether their private statements to us differ in any way from the public utterances. We are also interested in determining whether they press strongly for reconvened Geneva Conference, and on what terms. Intensity of pressure in this direction probably would reflect degree of ChiCom concern at likelihood escalation in Southeast Asia. We do not have indications that ChiComs presently anticipate US attack on North Viet-Nam. First session with new ChiCom representative affords good opportunity both to clarify US signals on SEA and to indicate our desire to keep open Warsaw channel. End FYI.

1. Suggest you open meeting by greeting Ambassador Wang Kuo-chuan and introducing staff. Then proceed on following lines:

2. “While we cannot boast of many successes or much agreement reached in these talks, hope you agree that they have served useful purpose in permitting contact and providing channel in case of need. We believe it is to advantage both our sides to have clear understanding of each other’s intentions, particularly in situations where there is serious threat of a major confrontation.

“In Southeast Asia we presently face just such a serious situation. We have read your statements as to obligation which you feel to support Communization of other nations. We see a confrontation between your ambitions and our resolve to prevent non-Communist governments of Southeast Asia from being overturned by infiltration and subversion supported and led from outside their borders.

“If in fact we stand perilously [close] to a confrontation, it is no pleasure to us. We have too much affection and respect for Chinese people to enjoy possibility of becoming involved in hostilities involving them. Nevertheless, if we correctly read your intentions, the possibility exists. If we have misread your intentions, we should be informed.”

3. Make following points, paraphrased from Depcirtel 49:²

a. US has vital interest and commitments in Asia as well as Europe, and does not intend to treat our Asian commitments more lightly than European ones.

b. Our specific commitment to the Republic of Viet-Nam goes back a decade. Systematic violation of 1954 Geneva Accords by Communists has forced us to respond.

c. Our consistent policy has been to assist South Viet-Nam in its efforts to maintain freedom and independence in the face of covert Communist aggression directed from outside SVN, and in violation of Geneva Accords. We intend to maintain that policy.

d. This battle is being fought by Vietnamese, with aid sent by US and other free nations, at request of Republic of Viet-Nam. So long as Viet Cong, supported and directed by DRV and encouraged by your side, continues its attacks on GVN, US will find it necessary to lend GVN such help as it needs to restore peace.

e. Secretary Rusk said on July 1 “peace ought to be possible in Southeast Asia without any extension of the fighting …. First objective of our policy and our desire in SEA is to exploit that possibility.”³ We are well aware of serious consequences that could flow from an expansion of war beyond the borders of SVN. We do not desire it and will seek to avoid it, but we shall not abandon our objectives or commitments out of fear of it.

f. As to negotiation, neutralization, or a political settlement to bring peace to Southeast Asia: we would like nothing better than an end to terror and killing. Negotiated settlements have been spelled out in Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962, and we believe present need to be for Communist observance of those accords, rather than negotiation of new arrangements.

4. In Laos a similar situation obtains. We shall continue our support for RLG. We support Geneva Agreement of 1962 and Government of National Union headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma. PL and DRV have endeavored to undermine arrangements. North Vietnamese troops have never left Laos as provided in Geneva Agreement and they continue use Laotian territory as route of infiltration to South Viet-Nam, in violation 1962 Agreements. With assistance of DRV, PL has taken over Plaine des Jarres, traditional base of neutralist forces under Kong Le. It has done so on fiction that neutralist forces in possession that area had suddenly become no longer “true neutralists,” apparently because PL decided they were not amenable to Communist control. So long as these Communist efforts destroy Tripartite Government continue, we shall continue to respond to requests for assistance by the legitimate government of Laos recognized by all participants in Geneva settlement.

We read in People’s Daily of July 6 that “US and Laotian right wing ousted Prince Souvanna from power by force, put him under house arrest, announced his removal from Premiership, etc.” You have fabricated your own version of events by ignoring explicit US condemnation of April 19 coup and continued US support for Souvanna, and by attempting to create a US announcement which does not exist. A policy based on unreality constitutes a peril for all involved. It is unfortunate enough for you to make such misstatements. We hope that you do not believe them. Similarly, we hope that you understand correctly the firmness of our resolve to support the RLG, and that you are not acting on basis of a willful underestimate of our seriousness and ability to assist RLG to defend its independence and neutrality.

5. Lest there be any misunderstanding of our policy in Far East, we wish to repeat what President Kennedy said on June 27, 1962: “purposes of the US in this area are peaceful and defensive.”⁴ We believe your side is aware that our presence in SEA is intended to help free nations there protect themselves against externally-directed subversion, and is not aimed at your destruction or at destruction of authorities in North Viet-Nam. We have no interest in maintenance of US presence in SEA beyond defense of those free governments. If US military presence is onerous to your side, simplest means of achieving its withdrawal would be for you and North Vietnamese to terminate pressures upon those governments.

6. Wang Kuo-chuan will probably start with lengthy series of complaints about US “aggressive acts” in FE. This will include People’s Daily editorial on 300th serious warning (FBIS 128) and editorial on U-2 (FBIS 139). Wang may then reiterate ChiCom serious warnings concerning attacks on North Viet-Nam (see July 9 People’s Daily editorial, FBIS 133, and ChiCom Government statement July 19, FBIS 141). He may repeat that “Chinese people cannot be expected to look on with folded arms in face of aggression in North Viet-Nam” and that a US attack on North Viet-Nam would pose threat to China’s peace and security.

7. Suggest you respond to warning re ChiCom actions in event US attack on NVN by referring to your statements para 4 d&e and para 6 above, and observing that his side’s peace and security not at stake, but rather his side’s ambitions.

8. Wang may press strongly for Geneva meeting on Laos. You should respond that such meetings seem desired by Communists to legitimize military conquest. Note Souvanna’s statement that meeting dependent upon restoration of neutralist position in Plaine des Jarres and an effective ceasefire. We favor negotiation among Lao leaders, or with other participants as proposed by Poland. If Wang presses this point or makes an official request for such a meeting tell him that you will refer request to Department.

9. Suggest you ignore routine “serious warnings.” If pressed, state that in past complaints have been without foundation but volunteer to submit specific complaints to Department. On U-2s, ignore unless Wang charges that we broke word in supplying further U-2s to GRC after first two were lost. In latter case, observe that US never made such commitment. US spokesman on September 9, 1962 said GRC had contracted purchase two U–2s.⁵ On September 13, 1962 President Kennedy said we had no plans to sell any further ones.⁶ We have subsequently had ample reason to change decision.

10. Wang may ask for US view on draft joint statement presented 120th meeting requesting US adhere Bandung principles and withdraw from Taiwan. Suggest you tell Wang US favors these principles, but we have observed that his side seems to have no scruples of conscience in pronouncing such principles, and then announcing support of Communist insurrection in free world. We believe in non-interference, and wished that his side really shared the belief. As for “withdrawal” from Taiwan US has treaty obligation with Republic of China. We will not abandon this obligation. There are a few thousand US military advisors on Taiwan. It requires a remarkable imagination to say that these men seized Taiwan by force of arms and are controlling the Republic of China and its army of several hundred thousand.

11. It is just possible that ChiComs may raise substance Mao July 11 interview with Japanese Socialist Party delegation concerning Taiwan. (See Hong Kong 57 to Department being repeated you.)⁷ Mao reportedly said if US would agree to withdraw forces from Taiwan China would guarantee not to install its own forces on island. You should respond that you presume this means ChiComs prepared renounce use of force against Taiwan provided US withdraws its military advisors. If response affirmative say you will report to Department. In any case, draw Wang out as to specifics of proposal.

12. If Wang raises question of transferring site of talks, tell him you will refer suggestion to Department.

13. When Wang suggests date for next meeting you should, if necessary, suggest that interval until next meeting not exceed two months.

14. In view sensitivity of topics, you are particularly urged to make detailed telegraphic report covering this meeting.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dean and Grant. Cleared in substance by William Bundy, and in draft by Carl Salans of L/FE, Allen Whiting of INR/RFE, William C. Trueheart of SEA, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Vietnamese Affairs Michael Forrestal, and Thomson. Approved by Grant. Repeated to London, Stockholm, Taipei, and Hong Kong.
2. Circular telegram 49, July 7; not printed. (Ibid., POL 1 ASIA SE–US)
3. For the transcript of the July 1 press conference at which Rusk made this statement, see Department of State Bulletin, July 20, 1964, pp. 82–88.
4. For the transcript of the press conference on June 27, 1962, at which Kennedy made this statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 509–517.
5. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXII, p. 318, footnote 2.
6. For the transcript of the press conference on September 13, 1962, at which Kennedy made this statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 674–681.
7. Dated July 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 JAPAN)