Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

315. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, June 26, 1968, 1110Z.

3513. Subject: Conversation with Gimo on U.S. attitudes toward China issues.

1. At President Chiang’s request I called on him at his Yangmingshan residence June 25. Gimo’s purpose was to convey his deep concern about implications June 22 New York Times editorial on China policy, and developing trend as he saw it of U.S. thinking on China issues. In particular he was disturbed about editorial’s assertion that USG considering urging President Chiang to withdraw GRC forces from Offshore Islands. Gimo said this type of statement, together with Anderson article, could encourage Chinese Communists to attack Offshores. He urged USG to issue statement repudiating editorial’s insinuation that USG is considering urging a withdrawal of GRC from Quemoy and Matsu.

2. In conversation which lasted nearly two hours Gimo dwelt on what he interpreted as alarming trends U.S. policy and public attitudes towards China. He cited editorial’s mention of Leonard Marks speech in early May and Katzenbach May 22 speech² and referred to Jack Anderson articles of last February on alleged high level USG discussions of China policy matters. He said he was particularly incensed by last para NY Times editorial which advocated withdrawal U.S. opposition to ChiCom entry to UN and initiation of steps to recognize Peking as seat of government for mainland China. Editorial stated: “This does not mean abandoning Taiwan, but does involve recognizing Taipei for what it is—and what it is not.” Gimo said editorial is insulting and has aroused strongest resentment among Chinese people. He reasoned some of contents NY Times editorial also reflected views some influential USG officials. He said editorials such as this make Chinese have serious doubts about U.S. policy towards China and Chinese cannot help but resent what U.S. is doing. He bluntly asked what was more in interests of USG—encouragement of ChiCom regime or friendly relations with GRC?

3. President stressed repeatedly that Quemoy and Matsu were integral part of China and could not be separated from territory of China. He said retention of Quemoy and Matsu were absolutely imperative for defense of Taiwan and Pescadores and GRC would fight to last man to defend Offshores. If Quemoy and Matsu were lost, he thought it was questionable whether Taiwan and Pescadores could be successfully defended even with U.S. air and naval power. Gimo said if U.S. should adopt views attributed to U.S. officials in Anderson article and give up defense of the Offshores, this would have extremely bad effect on morale, would incite ChiCom attack on Offshores, would give ChiComs momentum required for successful attack on Taiwan, and would have lasting effects even more serious than Vietnam war. In addition, hardliners in NVN would be encouraged to stiffen position at Paris Peace Talks and to intensify war.

4. President Chiang urged U.S. to clarify once and for all its basic position towards status of Offshores. Gimo repeatedly returned to this theme and urged that USG for its own interests and for interests security in Asia should openly state that NY Times editorial has no foundation in fact and is completely groundless. He stated “for the sake of China and the U.S. and our mutual interests the insinuations contained in the NY Times editorial must be denied by USG. Only by doing this can damage already caused by editorial and Anderson articles be minimized.” Gimo added that not only had NY Times editorial caused considerable concern here but many leading members of U.S. Congress had made appeasing statements concerning Communist China. This was why he thought it important for USG to make concise, resolute statement clarifying U.S. position toward Offshores along lines that Offshores are integral part of territory of Republic of China and U.S. Government has no right to determine their disposition. He referred with warm approbation to Secretary Rusk’s statement concerning Taiwan³ which was along similar lines and said there was even more reason for U.S. to make such a statement about Offshores since they were undisputed Chinese territory long before Taiwan was retroceded at end of World War II.

5. President warned that if USG did not come out with such a statement he seriously estimated that Communist China would be likely to launch an attack on the Offshore Islands between now and inauguration new U.S. President. He felt Peking would misinterpret NY Times editorial, Anderson articles, and other official statements. Partly for internal reasons—to draw dissident factions together, and partly because apparent weakness or at least uncertainty U.S. posture—ChiComs would think they had golden opportunity to attach Offshores. Gimo then added that speaking as a friend, present U.S. attitude towards Viet Cong, NVN, and Communist China appeared to Asian people as reminiscent of the attitude Chamberlain had adopted toward Nazi Germany prior WW II. He dwelt on this point at some length. He then said he believed if U.S. continues with present irresolute attitudes it would lead to World War Three, since Communist China will be encouraged to pursue more aggressive designs.

6. I told the President I appreciated his willingness to give frank expression to his views and I respected the depth of his convictions. I then said that I felt he was giving too much weight to both the NY Times editorial and the Anderson articles, that neither had any standing as far as U.S. Government is concerned. Repeated that NY Times editorials, like all other expressions of our free press, represented private views of newspaper and not official USG policy or positions. I said that I felt editorial was regrettable but it was nothing new for him and many others to read unpalatable views in NY Times or indeed in other papers. I told Pres that as he knew there were various shades of opinion in U.S. concerning China but, the administration supported by the Congress, was steadfast on basic policy as it now stands.

7. I then mentioned that Gimo knew we had not approached his government to suggest evacuation Quemoy or Matsu. I told him that there were officials at lower levels in the U.S. Government who constantly write background papers and think pieces embodying a great variety of views on various contingency situations, but these papers do not constitute policy. I said that there should be no concern because at the policy making levels of the government our policy towards China was well established. The expressions of editorial opinion published in our leading newspapers may have some influence but they do not necessarily represent any majority opinion. I told the President that in his own experience through the years he has been able to put up with a great deal of press commentary of this type. I expressed hope that President could continue to live with expressed views that were contrary to ROC’s policy. I said that Washington was inclined to believe it was not useful in general for USG to refute or even take cognizance of questionable editorials on foreign policy issues. It would be a confusing and unprofitable business and would draw added attention to these editorials. I said I doubted if it would be possible to have a rebuttal statement issued such as the President desired, but I would transmit his request to Washington without delay.

8. I referred to his remarks on appeasement and stated that it pained me very much, with our very high casualty rate in Vietnam and with our heavy additional defense burdens in Korea, in Western Europe and elsewhere in the world, to hear the President intimate that the United States is pursuing a Chamberlain type appeasement policy. I told the President that when we are making such heavy sacrifices in the cause of freedom and standing firm on all the cardinal principles of freedom we are defending, any characterization of “appeasement” was inappropriate and could not be justified.

9. I then referred to various speeches that have been made by top-level U.S. officials holding out the possibility of additional contacts with mainland China. I told the President that those who were advocating seeking limited contacts are not thinking in terms of formal diplomatic relations or enhancement of the international position of Communist China. Rather they were thinking in terms of establishing a better understanding with the Chinese people on the mainland, his people. I said there is a fairly widespread desire in the U.S. for cultural, intellectual, medical and press contacts with the people of the mainland. This however was not equivalent to the advocacy of formal recognition of the ChiCom Government nor the acceptance or condoning of the Chinese Communist regime or its policies. I suggested that over the long run such people-to-people contacts, if they could be brought about, might provide some means of offsetting the dangerous spread of poisonous anti-U.S. feeling and misunderstanding fomented by the Communists in a whole new generation on the mainland.

10. Memcon will be forwarded by airgram.⁴ Insights and recommendations about Gimo’s position and request will be subject of septel.⁵

McConaughy

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
2. Reference is to a speech on China by Under Secretary Katzenbach before the National Press Club on May 21. For text, see the Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1968, pp. 737–740.
3. Reference is to Secretary Rusk’s remarks at a press conference on June 21; for text, see ibid., July 8, 1968, pp. 33–38.
4. The memorandum of conversation was enclosed with airgram A–742 from Taipei, July 2. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CHINAT-US) Airgram A–807 from Taipei, July 26, forwarded a summary record of the conversation prepared by the Foreign Ministry. (Ibid., POL CHINAT-US)
5. McConaughy sent a message to Rusk and Bundy in telegram 3554 from Taipei, June 28, calling their attention to Chiang’s request. He commented further in telegram 3594, July 2. (Both ibid.)