Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

312. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 13–9–68

Washington, May 23, 1968.

THE SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK IN COMMUNIST CHINA

The Problem

To estimate the main trends and outlook in China over the next year or so.

Conclusions

A. The situation inside Communist China is still highly fluid and the outlook uncertain. Disorder, confusion, and unrest continue but have been reduced since the high water mark last summer. Nevertheless, the ranks of those alienated by the Greater Proletarian Cultural Revolution have grown; the costs in political control, social discipline, and economic progress have far outweighed the gains. Though Mao was successful in breaking high-level opposition in the old party apparatus, in its broader aspects his Cultural Revolution has been a failure and we believe it will be gradually phased out.

B. Mao still appears to be the central figure and source of basic policy. Mao and the regime are officially committed to the reconstruction of a new framework for administrative and political control. On balance, we believe that the trend will be toward regaining some stability, in part because of the increased influence of the moderate elements in Peking. But there still will be sharp twists and turns, occasional crises, and disorder and turmoil at various levels which will reflect strong differences among factions and leaders over policies and tactics.

C. The military will remain Peking’s most reliable instrument over the coming year. As the only cohesive force with a nationwide system of command and control, the military will have to serve a variety of administrative and control functions. The scope of the rebuilding effort—political, economic, and social—may require the heavy support of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for some years to come. Military dominance in political life may become institutionalized, particularly if political reconstruction bogs down in violence and disarray requiring the repressive force of the PLA. The corollary to this increased political role is the diversion of the PLA from normal military routine and a consequent reduction in its military readiness.

D. The damage to the economy as a direct result of the Cultural Revolution includes depressed industrial production, a delay in modernization and economic growth, aggravated labor problems, setbacks in the training of technical specialists, and a general hiatus in the formulation of new economic policies and plans. The cumulative damage to the economy of prolonged political turmoil will not be easily or quickly repaired. Whatever the political course for 1968, agricultural output is not likely to repeat last year’s very good harvests, which benefited from exceptionally good weather. At best, China can hope only to restore stability and balance to the economy in 1968, foregoing any prospect of expansion. Indeed, there is a possibility that a reduction in food output, combined with problems of collection and distribution, could cause a serious food shortage by 1969, which in turn could have serious political repercussions.

E. “Red Guard diplomacy” cost Peking last year in relations with Communist as well as non-Communist regimes. Since last summer, however, the regime has taken steps to reduce the violent and provocative influence of internal affairs on foreign relations. In the main, the Cultural Revolution has not altered the general line of Chinese policy abroad; it still remains revolutionary in tone but cautious and prudent in deeds. Preoccupation with internal affairs is likely to relegate foreign concerns to a secondary role.

F. A major uncertainty in any estimate of China’s future is the problem of Mao’s passing. The events of the past two years have made it more likely that Mao’s departure will usher in a stormy and possibly protracted period in which policy differences and power aspirations will continue to fuel a leadership struggle. Mao’s legacy is likely to be an enfeebled party, a confused bureaucracy, and a divided and harried leadership. In our view the ultimate result will be to accelerate the rejection of Mao’s doctrines and policies.

[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]

1. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 90 D 110. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A note on the cover sheet states that it was submitted by Helms and prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate on May 23 except the AEC and FBI representatives, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. A May 22 memorandum from INR/REA Director Fred Greene to Hughes, filed with the source text, states that the estimate was the product of very lengthy discussions reflecting a long-standing disagreement within the Intelligence Community over the nature of the relationships among the top Chinese leaders. The key question, according to Greene, was whether Mao Tse-tung remained the architect of basic Chinese Communist policy and the prime mover in the regime or whether the underlying political dynamic was a factional struggle with Mao playing a relatively restricted role.