Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

310. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, May 14, 1968, 0757Z.

3071. Subj: Country Team Assessment of GRC Intentions. Ref: State 135828;² Taipei 2420.³

1. There have been no recent indications that the GRC intends to mount any major unilateral military operations against the mainland in the near future, though small-scale para-military or air operations could be launched without prior U.S. knowledge. Desultory planning for mainland recovery continues, but recent emphasis appears to have been rather on exploitation of propaganda windfall inherent in latest Maoist attacks on opposition figures as “KMT reactionaries”.

2. GRC actions in the Taiwan Strait have continued to be defensive. As promised by Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo at the time of the Pueblo incident,⁴ the GRC has taken no action that could be construed as provocative, and CAF patrols have only recently resumed previous practice of flying within the ChiCom-claimed twelve-mile territorial limit, with no unusual ChiCom reaction. In late February and early March GRC shore batteries on the Offshore Islands on several occasions fired on a number of small high-speed targets, with no hits reported. In view of the fact that none of these “targets” was visually sighted, it is likely that they were radar “ghosts” or clutter. The MND later admitted that they (MND) considered them to be products of “seasonal meteorological anomalies”, since much the same type of activity occurred during the same period in 1967. The GRC has shown some concern over, but so far has not reacted to, apparent ChiCom augmentation of naval forces in the Fuchou-Matsu area, which could in time pose a threat to GRC resupply of Matsu.

3. After more than a year of quiescence, the problem of the KMT irregulars in the tri-border area has taken a new tack. Recent offers by the Thais and Burmese to the irregulars to serve against Communist insurgents have spurred the GRC into action. We know privately that GRC planning is underway to unify the various irregular groups to form an effective anti-Communist force in Burma under GRC control. Initially, only money and equipment would be supplied by the GRC, but the planners envisage a time when men would be sent to help the irregulars, at least during some operations. GRC officials feel that this plan would offer least political difficulty for the present and would be flexible enough for future contingency use of the irregulars. Actual GRC implementation of these plans would represent a marked shift from assurances previously given the USG on the KMT irregular question, but such implementation would in any event prove difficult, in our opinion, in view of the resistance irregular leaders have shown previous efforts to increase GRC control over them.

4. Contingency military plans for unilateral mainland recovery efforts are now continuing, but we know privately that top GRC leadership acknowledges the general unfeasibility of existing plans and is aware of GRC inability to take much major unilateral military initiative against the mainland.

5. We know that the drastic MAP cut is causing unease among the leaders of the GRC, but Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo and his subordinates have thus far outwardly taken the news calmly and have apparently moved to absorb cuts through reductions and careful budgeting. The GRC is taking measures to earn foreign exchange for procurement of military equipment through repair of battle-damaged U.S. equipment. Privately, we know that there are GRC plans to siphon off for military spending at least part of a $30 million amount supposedly allotted for scientific development.

6. The GRC has seized on recent Maoist attacks against opposition figures as being Kuomintang agents and supporters to try to breathe new life into the GRC’s mainland recovery theme. This propaganda windfall has received heavy coverage in the local press, where Maoist denunciation of alleged association with the KMT has been played as proof of the vitality of KMT clandestine organizations on the mainland and as support for a GRC prognosis that Mao will be toppled by anti-Communists (stimulated by KMT agents), first linking up with anti-Maoists in the Chinese Communist Party, and finally with GRC forces from Taiwan. GRC press coverage has been drawn almost entirely from ChiCom prop-aganda output, however, with few claims of specific GRC agent activities. We have no reliable evidence supporting any significant increase of the GRC’s modest clandestine activities on the China mainland.

McConaughy

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-CHINAT. Secret; Noforn. Repeated to Hong Kong and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. See footnote 2, Document 242.
3. Telegram 2420 from Taipei, March 12, stated that the previous 2 months had yielded no indications of GRC plans for unilateral actions against the mainland. (Ibid.)
4. Telegram 2015 from Taipei, January 29, reported the promise made by Chiang that afternoon. (Ibid.)