299. Editorial Note
At 2146 EST on February 13, 1968, a U.S. Navy A–1H was shot down by a Chinese MIG about 5 miles off the coast of Hainan. The plane was one of two unarmed aircraft that had strayed into Chinese air space while en route from the Philippines to Danang. The pilot of the other plane reported that he had seen a parachute and heard a beeper after the plane was shot down. (Memoranda for the record by Brigadier General James A. Shannon, USAF, and Rear Admiral S.D. Cramer, Jr., USN, of the National Military Command Center, both February 14; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. XII)
Secretary of Defense McNamara called President Johnson the next morning to inform him that the plane had been shot down. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, recording of a telephone conversation between Johnson and McNamara, February 14, 1968, 7:53 a.m., tape F68.02, side A, PNO 5) The President’s Special Assistant Walt W. Rostow reported in a February 14, noon, memorandum to the President, that the Seventh Fleet wanted to launch a rescue helicopter from the USS Kearsarge at 0400 Vietnam time, with fighter aircraft from the carrier Coral Sea providing protection. Rostow’s memorandum states that Secretary of State Rusk opposed the operation, arguing that the risk to the helicopter crew was too great and that the man was in Chinese territorial waters, and that Secretary of Defense McNamara also opposed it. JCS Chairman General Wheeler and Secretary of Defense-designate Clark M. Clifford advocated making a rescue attempt. (Ibid., Intelligence File, Plane Downed in Hainan Territorial Waters, Feb. 1968) A second Rostow memorandum of 12:40 p.m. states that the fighter aircraft were to remain 25 miles off shore unless the helicopter was attacked and that the entire rescue party was under strict instruction to initiate no hostile action. (Ibid.)
President Johnson met with his advisers at 1:14 p.m. to discuss whether or not to undertake the rescue attempt. At this time, Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, and Clifford all recommended against it. Rusk, [Page 642] McNamara, and Clifford expressed concern about the risk of conflict with the Chinese as well as the risk to the helicopter crew. Wheeler proposed launching an electronic aircraft outside the 12-mile limit to determine if beeps from the pilot’s beeper were drifting out to sea, and the President approved this action. (Notes of Meeting; ibid., Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, February 14, 1968—1:14 p.m., Foreign Policy Advisors on Violation of Chinese Airspace) A brief memorandum of February 15 from Rostow to the President stated that no beeper had been heard. (Ibid., Intelligence File, Plane Downed in Hainan Territorial Waters, Feb. 1968)
A February 14 memorandum from Rostow to McNamara states that the President wanted a full but very prompt investigation of the reasons for violation of Chinese Communist air space during the previous year, including a complete report concerning the latest incident; it had been reported to him that there had been nine such violations. He wanted the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a matter of high and urgent priority, to undertake steps to eliminate, if possible, the likelihood of further such violations. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, China Reds 360) A February 19 memorandum from McNamara to the President states that there had been eight confirmed violations since January 1, 1967, but that there might have been other unconfirmed violations. He forwarded a February 17 memorandum from General Wheeler summarizing the reasons for the violations and steps that had been and were being taken to avoid such incidents, including efforts to keep aircraft away from Chinese territory and improvements in radar and communications. (Filed with a February 20 covering note from Rostow; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. XII)
A February 15 letter from Ambassador Gronouski to Chinese Charge Ch’en stated that the aircraft had inadvertently strayed into the “territorial airspace claimed by your country,” requested information pertaining to the pilot’s welfare, and urged his release at the earliest possible time. (Telegram 115499 to Warsaw and telegram 2106 from Warsaw, February 15; Department of State, Central Files, POL 31–1 CHICOM-US) A March 5 letter from Ch’en to Gronouski called the violation of Chinese air space in this incident a “ferocious war provocation” by the United States and stated that he had been instructed to issue a “serious warning and firm protest.” It gave no information concerning the pilot, nor did several subsequent efforts elicit any information. (Telegram 2284 from Warsaw, March 5; memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winthrop G. Brown to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, February 13, 1969; ibid.)