Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

283. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, October 27, 1967, 2244Z.

61104. Refs: A. Taipei 1052; B. Taipei 1053; C. Taipei A–274.²

1. We agree with your assessment of CCK’s motives in his suggestion that US–GRC intelligence cooperation be improved. Specifically, we agree that CCK’s likely fundamental motive is President Chiang’s concern that apparent lessening of mainland disorders means lessening GRC opportunities. We do not overlook or minimize, however, that another likely motive of Chiang and CCK is to probe US policy and operational interests.

2. Whatever CCK’s motive, we agree that his approach offers a useful opportunity for follow-up conversations and do not wish to give flat negative. We suggest, therefore, that at your next meeting you confirm our interest in closer consultation and in meaningful joint intelligence gathering activities with a view to meeting our mutual need for more complete grasp of mainland situation. You may wish to solicit CCK’s views as to what specific proposals he would like us to consider and ask him how he wishes to proceed. FYI. We refer of course to desirability of CCK agreeing that consultations on clandestine intelligence operations would best be conducted [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. End FYI.

3. We suggest you also confirm our interest in improving our respective analyses of mainland situation and in continuing to exchange views on this subject. In that connection, you may wish to mention current plan to have several of our mainland experts visit Taipei this December for informal exchange of views with GRC and fact that Department now providing Chinese Embassy on regular basis with our current appraisals of mainland situation. FYI. Possibilities for providing GRC greater volume intelligence documents appear extremely limited, but we prepared review situation if CCK indicates specific areas of interest. End FYI.

4. It is possible that in your next and subsequent exchanges a clearer picture of CCK’s objectives may emerge. His conversation with you as reported Refs A and C suggest that he may be seeking some expression of US support for an expanded GRC program of “political warfare” action on mainland, including sabotage, guerrilla drops and clandestine political activities. He also may wish to involve us in joint planning of such activity. Should he make such purpose clear, it would be necessary specifically to inform CCK that our established consultations ground-rule applies to political warfare (as distinct from intelligence gathering) as well as military action against mainland. It might also then be necessary to reiterate your entirely appropriate definition of US attitude toward provocative actions (Ref B, para 6³ and Ref C, page 6, para 3).

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Republic of China Country Director Thomas P. Shoesmith; cleared by Jacobson and Holdridge; and approved by Berger.
2. See Document 282 and footnotes 2 and 3 thereto.
3. Reference is apparently to paragraph 6 of telegram 1052, Document 282.