Office of the Historian

249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China1

Washington, March 16, 1967, 3:43 p.m.

56346. For Ambassador McConaughy. Ref: Taipei 2623.2

1.
Please take early suitable opportunity to convey to President Chiang Kai-shek following oral message from the President:3
2.
Ambassador Goldberg has personally given the President a full report of his March 1 conversation with President Chiang. The President very much appreciates the forthrightness with which President Chiang expressed to Goldberg his views on Viet-Nam, Mainland China, and other aspects of the situation in Asia. He highly values these exchanges of views between our Governments.
3.
As President Chiang had requested, Ambassador Goldberg told the President of President Chiang’s belief that now is the time for the Republic of China to attack and overthrow the Chinese Communist regime on the Mainland and of the reasoning which led President Chiang to this view.
4.
The President wishes to say that he has given the most serious thought to what President Chiang has said. On this subject the U.S. Government’s views are known to President Chiang, and there has been no change in our position. The U.S. has long sought to bring about peace in the Taiwan Strait and to this end has for many years urged the Chinese Communists to renounce the use of force there. The U.S. agrees with the Republic of China’s position that its mission of restoring freedom to the population on the Mainland is to be achieved mainly by political means, not military force, and was pleased to see this theme stressed in President Chiang’s New Year’s message to the Chinese people.
5.
In the situation in which we now find ourselves in Viet-Nam, we do not seek or advocate any extension of the war. From the outset we have carefully defined our objective in Viet-Nam as limited to stopping the aggression. We have refrained from using our full military power, and we have sought to limit the war and terminate it by negotiations.
6.
The course which President Chiang advocated to Ambassador Goldberg would run counter to the policies we are pursuing in Viet-Nam. Such a course would involve the Republic of China in risks and hazards and would give rise to the danger of a wider war with incalculable consequences for the peoples of Asia, the United States, and the world. The American Government and people would not only disapprove such an action but would oppose it.
7.
The President wants President Chiang to know how deeply grateful he is personally for the generous cooperation President Chiang’s Government has extended to the United States in connection with the Viet-Nam war, for its economic and other contributions in Viet-Nam, and for the airbase facilities granted U.S. forces in Taiwan. The President is also very conscious of the threat from the Mainland to which Taiwan is exposed and he wishes to assure President Chiang once again that the United States stands squarely behind the commitments made in its Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China.4
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/GOLDBERG. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Bennett and Berger, cleared by Sisco and Jenkins, and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to USUN for Goldberg. A March 13 memorandum from Sisco and Berger to Rusk transmitting the draft telegram is attached to the source text. Although the telegram lists Jenkins as the person who cleared for the White House, it was cleared by President Johnson. A March 15 memorandum from Rostow to the President summarizing the proposed message, with a copy attached, has the President’s check mark on the approval line. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VIII)↩
  2. See footnote 2, Document 245.↩
  3. McConaughy reported in telegram 2839 from Taipei, March 18, that he had delivered the oral message to President Chiang, who did not comment. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT–US 1)↩
  4. Printed from an unsigned copy.↩