Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

242. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, February 25, 1967, 0417Z.

2547. Ref State 135828.² Subj: Country Team assessment of GRC intentions.

1. Conclusion: There are no signs that the GRC intends to make any significant military or paramilitary moves against Communist China in the near future; on the contrary, the GRCs current stance is marked by its cautious, wait-and-see character.

2. Discussion: During the latter half of 1966, the GRC groped for a proper response to the upset of Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Various intelligence and paramilitary schemes for possible exploitation of the situation were drawn up, but they consisted in the main of operations beyond GRC capabilities, or possible only with sizeable US support. The GRC apparently understands that such US support will not be forthcoming.

3. GRC intelligence units continue to formulate plans for sabotage and other small-scale operations against the mainland, but these units lack the capabilities to carry out these plans to any significant extent. Results are unlikely to be any better than in the past.

4. Since last fall there has been some shift of emphasis in the GRC’s approach to the problem of mainland turmoil. President Chiang has ruled specifically against any precipitate action at this time. This decision was made explicit in the President’s New Year’s message, in which he called for political rather than military action. Subsequently, we have received reliable intelligence reports documenting the GRC’s disinclination to take military action at this time.

5. This wait-and-see stance is largely a product of the GRC’s limited capabilities for unilateral action, but it is reinforced now by real conviction that outside pressures might retard rather than accelerate disintegrative trends on the mainland. This position may shift if a real break-down of Communist authority on the mainland occurs, or if the GRC concludes that it has occurred. Even then, however, we would expect the response of the GRC to be conditioned by the amount of US support it thought it could muster.

McConaughy

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM–CHINAT. Secret; Limdis.
2. Telegram 135828, February 13, suggested that the Embassy consider reinstituting its former period telegrams summarizing indications of possible GRC actions against the mainland. It suggested reporting on a biweekly basis while the current mainland turmoil continued at a significant level. (Ibid.)