Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

239. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, February 17, 1967, 0758Z.

2460. Ref Taipei 2351.²

1. During call by Joe Yager and myself on DefMin Chiang Ching-kuo today latter raised subject of my approach to MOFA Feb 8 on GRC irregulars in tri-border area.

2. He indicated mild surprise that I had gone to MOFA since, he said, MOFA was not conversant with the problem. I refrained from replying that that was one reason I had gone through MOFA, to be sure they would be informed.

3. He said flatly and directly that GRC was not supplying arms or funds to irregular units in Thailand. He said Thai Govt had repeatedly requested that GRC exercise better control over the units to prevent loss of civil control in northern Thailand. He said neither Tuan Hsi-wen nor Li Wen-huan was amenable to much control, and that they had until recently refused to come to Taiwan for discussions. Tuan had finally visited Taiwan a few months ago, but conversations had not been satisfactory. Gen Hsu Ju-ch’i had just been sent to the area by the GRC to look into present conditions, and when Hsu returned DefMin would be in touch with Embassy again. DefMin said he thought USG had not understood the situation correctly, possibly because of statement Tuan Hsi-wen might have made on return to Thailand, in order to bolster his prestige asserting that GRC would send assistance.

4. DefMin repeated that GRC aware of delicacy of situation and had no intention of augmenting or supplying the units. He said that he was referring, as I had earlier, only to the organized units, and not to certain intelligence collection efforts in the border area, which would of course continue.

5. I thanked him for the information, and asked about the reported plans for an air lift through Laos. He said that the irregular units in Thailand had requested that the GRC arrange an air shipment through Laos, but that the GRC had refused.

6. Comment: Lack of candor on this subject is par for the course and was to be expected. However believe we have made some headway on this problem in that: (a) DefMin has assured us that GRC is not going to augment or supply the units (and even if this turns out to be untrue we have additional leverage because of the assertion); (b) He has promised to be in touch with us again when Gen Hsu returns and we may be able to glean more information and obtain more assurances at that time; (c) He has denied any intention to establish an air supply route through Laos, (although at same time apparently misrepresenting the GRC’s reported recent use of the route).

Hummel

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–5 CHINAT. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Rangoon, and Vientiane.
2. Telegram 2351 from Taipei, February 7, reported that in a meeting with Sampson Shen that day, Hummel expressed U.S. concern about reports that increasing GRC planning and activity seemed to be leading toward an enlarged and more active paramilitary force in the Thai-Laos-Burma border area and stated the U.S. view that such increased activity would backfire. Hummel was carrying out instructions conveyed in telegram 131645, February 4. (Both ibid.)