Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

236. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, February 3, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Highlights of China Panel Meetings, February 1–2²

1. No one foresaw a year ago the breakdown of the Chinese Communist regime’s authority and the resulting chaos. There was also agreement that no one could foresee what China would be like a year from now.

2. It was comforting to note the degree of agreement among the outside experts and government personnel as to the broad outlines of what is now going on in China and the probable antecedent developments (i.e., general confirmation of INR and Agency studies).

3. There was general agreement that while failures in domestic and foreign policy, Mao’s fear of revisionism, resulting policy differences and opposition to the excesses of the Cultural Revolution all contributed to the present situation, it has now become basically a struggle over who is to run China and other considerations have become blurred in the confusion.

4. Basic problems running through present difficulties include:

a. China’s thin resources margin;

b. the difficulty of preserving elan in times of failure;

c. deep ideological wrenchings of the Sino-Soviet disagreement; and

d. disagreement as to what measures work best, considering the magnitude of the problem of governing and modernizing such a vast country with limited resources.

5. For purposes of discussion, the spectrum of possible outcomes was broken down into four categories:

a. Mao-Lin reconsolidation of power. There was agreement that this was hard to envisage unless the military holds together and is willing to play a more active role. There seemed to be about an even split of opinion as to the likelihood of this. In any event, there was agreement that such a solution would be short-range and that we will surely be dealing with a different China of some sort in the fairly near future.

b. A compromise, probably under Chou En-Lai’s aegis. This would be likely only if 1) a successful attempt is made to moderate the Cultural Revolution and 2) the desire for nationhood is given an opportunity to assert itself because of the prospect of the country’s falling apart.

c. The Party apparatus wins predominant support of the Army and prevails. Many participants considered this to be the most likely of the four possibilities, but some felt that the Mao-Lin faction might still win the first round. Several believed that in this event, Mao would be kicked up rather than out, in order to borrow the umbrella of his prestige and charisma. Some thought that Mao’s prestige may now be sinking to the point where, if the trend continues much longer, he could actually be a liability.

d. The country breaks up into regional units, probably under predominantly military control. (Also considered in this category was emergence of a “Nasser” with broad control. Another variant would be loss of peripheral regions under Soviet domination, but set up as “autonomous.”)

6. The group not only differed in judgment as to which of these outcomes was the most likely but also as to which would be most desirable from the U.S. standpoint. There was agreement, however, that we probably could not appreciably affect the outcome, and that attempts to do so would be counterproductive at best and dangerously foolhardy at worst.

7. The distinction was drawn between a “posture” and a “policy” toward Communist China. Agreement was unanimous that our present “posture” of quiet reasonableness and hope for ultimate reconciliation is about right. Several participants questioned whether we had a full-fledged “policy” toward Communist China at the present time, and some maintained that we could not or should not have, insofar as “policy” implies a series of actions. Several participants argued strongly that we should take policy steps even now. It was conceded that any attempted steps toward reconciliation now would be rebuffed and would not appre-ciably affect China. The purpose would be to prepare for the future, to tidy up present “anachronisms” and to gain in the eyes of third countries. It was pointed out by others that in doing so we might well lose substantially in the eyes of Asian friends, who, after all, are the ones most concerned. It was strongly felt by some that even though it might not seem to make sense to attempt conciliatory gestures when they would not meet with response, the U.S. could only take these steps with grace at a time when China is weak—i.e., when they would not be interpreted as a knuckling under to pressure from a strong China.

8. The discussion of possible policy steps (trade, contacts and travel, UN membership and Taiwan considerations) was felt to be too brief, because of time, and the suggestion was made that these items be taken up in greater degree at the next meeting (probably early June).

9. There was a division of opinion as to whether in posture and policy we should in the U.S. interests:

a. try to drive the mainland into deeper chaos—or at least passively witness such chaos with satisfaction, or

b. even now adopt policies which would look toward a time of more reasonable and pragmatic government in China and its articulation with the world community.

10. There were three “special appearances” during the conference:

a. Walter McConaughy spoke on the policies, attitudes, and likely plans of the GRC. About one-third of the group around the coffee table, during the break, expressed the opinion that this was “a good try” but actually was a waste of conference time, since everyone was already aware of what was said.

b. Foy Kohler spoke interestingly on Sino-Soviet differences and their implications. In brief, he saw no prospect of a very meaningful reconciliation but believed that if a faction came to power in China which sought Soviet help, a limited price in such help might be paid for “the psychological asset of papering over differences between the two Communist giants.” He thought the Soviets were and would continue to be active in trying to bring about such a regime.

c. The Secretary, after a brief opening statement concerning the problem of organizing a durable peace, fielded questions on a variety of subjects with his usual skill and contagious conviction. Most of the time was spent on Vietnam.

Comment: The conference went well and was mutually advantageous. Nothing really new emerged but there was general agreement that thinking about some issues had been usefully sharpened. I should say that the conference was a distinct success from the standpoint of government-academic relationships.

I found especially notable the relative lack of disagreement with our policies in Vietnam and total lack of tendentiousness in discussing them. This contrasts markedly with much of my experience of last summer’s academic swing—especially at Harvard.

In thinking back over the conference, I am left with one outstanding disappointment. It seems to me that our academic friends are concentrating in their policy probings on some possibly useful but peripheral measures. As you know, before the present chaos on the mainland set in, I saw some utility in trying to go a bit further than we had in “bridge-building.” Considering the state of the mainland since, however, the real question concerning these relatively minor and peripheral issues becomes one of timing. As I restated recently I now believe that, having not taken some of these steps in more normal times, we should postpone them until we can make a much better judgment as to the course of events in China. (Recognition of Mongolia is in a different category.) I do not believe that our Asian friends, particularly, would understand our motivations and there is some merit in saving our limited leverage for a time when some reason returns to the mainland. Meanwhile it seems to me that an occasional high-level reference to the desire for ultimate reconciliation is still in order.

We should marshall our planning resources not so much on matters of travel, limited trade and a new UN approach at this time, but concentrate on the central issues: those having to do with China in the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. We have, of course, been making a tremendous—and I believe eminently correct—effort in filling the power vacuum left by the demise of Japanese militarism, pre-empting it from communist militarism. As a result, we are beginning to have an Asia of real hope. If we are beginning to approach success in the knottiest of Asian problems, the Sino-Vietnam one, we are entering a broad watershed period which will require some changes for its other side. Very little was said in the conference about how China of whatever future complexion relates to the future role of Japan, the future status of Taiwan, the sort of Southeast Asia we want to see post-Vietnam and how much it will require, what sort of presence from us, the possible future pull on China from successful Asian regional ventures, the desirability and degree of Soviet presence and investment in some of these ventures, the composition of probable future regional military coalescences (probably first involving parts of Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific), the likelihood and desirability of Japanese participation and the need for U.S. balancing of Japan in that event, the effects if Japan and/or India go nuclear, etc. Some of these were mentioned, but hardly more than en passant. I hope that in the next meeting we can gain the benefit of more discussion in these areas from this impressive group of outsiders.

Al Jenkins

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VIII. Confidential.
2. On December 7, 1966, the Department of State announced the formation of a panel of advisers on China comprised of A. Doak Barnett, Alexander Eckstein, John K. Fairbank, Julius C. Holmes, Ralph L. Powell, Lucian W. Pye, Robert A. Scalapino, Philip D. Sprouse, George E. Taylor, and Paul A. Varg. The text of the press release was sent to Taipei in telegram 98530 the same day. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CHICOM–US) Records pertaining to the panel, including records of its discussions, are ibid., EA Files: Lot 73 D 8.