227. Memorandum From William McAfee of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to the Bureau’s Director (Hughes)1
SUBJECT
- Regular CIA-EA Meeting, 29 December 1966
PARTICIPANTS
- EA—Messrs. Bundy, Berger, Lakeland, Hamilton (Laos), and Pickering (Thailand)
- CIA—Messrs. Colby and Smith
- INR—Mr. Gardner
Nationalist China
Mr. Colby said that during his recent trip to the Far East he had spent some time in Taipei and while there had had a two hour talk with Chiang Ching-kuo, the Generalissimo’s son.2 Most of the talk had had to do with the suspension/cancellation of the Grosbeak operation and Chiang, Mr. Colby said, had given it to him with “both barrels.”
Mr. Bundy noted that during his own recent visit he too had been put under fire by Chiang, on the same cause.
Mr. Colby went on to recount some of the details of his own experience. Chiang had asserted that cessation of the operation was “unacceptable”, and he rejected flatly as unnecessary Mr. Colby’s thought that perhaps representatives of the GRC and the US might conduct a joint review of the matter and the effectiveness of the Grosbeak operation. The decision to end the exercise, Chiang said, was his reward for having relied upon the United States and particularly on CIA. The GRC had lost some 120 men in the Grosbeak incursions and he simply could not see how, with that investment in human lives, he could confront his Air Force with the decision to end the program. It was with extreme difficulty that he had succeeded in establishing tenuous authority over the older army generals; he had achieved this only by pointing to Air Force support, and the decision to suspend thus would cost him not only Air Force fealty but also would thereby gravely endanger his position with the Army.
Mr. Bundy here interjected that this was a pretty serious comment on the solidity of Chiang Ching-kuo’s authority, and Mr. Colby agreed.
[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]
Further, the Grosbeak decision had come on top of a number of other depressants. There had been a turn-down of General Yeh’s list of proposals [Page 496] for operations against the mainland, there had been the abrasions of the Chirep issue in the UN this year, there had been the withdrawal of F–104’s from Taiwan, etc. The effects were becoming noticeable. The Nationalists were no longer pushing the idea of a joint GRC-US intelligence office, or of a joint planning group to consider actions against the mainland. Nationalist cooling on these, Mr. Colby said, was some cause for relief. A slow-down in U–2 operations could be considered as slightly more serious, but only if there were a choking off the SI operations on the island would we suffer palpable damage to our intelligence interests. Mr. Bundy agreed.
Mr. Colby went on to say that from Chiang Ching-kuo’s point of view recent developments had been unfortunate, but that it was time he faced up to issues. It was important that his thinking be brought back to the realm of the real world and off the level of fantasy, and that ideas of invading the mainland and reassuming control there be abandoned. Bringing the Nationalists to face reality was bound to be a laborious and difficult process, but it was necessary.
[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]
- Source: Department of State, INR Files, 1966 FE Weekly Staff Meetings. Secret. Also sent to Denney and Evans. Drafted by James R. Gardner of INR/DDC.↩
- An unsigned December 15 memorandum to Bundy conveyed the text of a cable report from Colby, who met with Chiang Ching-kuo on December 12. (Ibid., China, 1966)↩