195. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1
SUBJECT
- ChiRep
The latest tally on probable voting is about where it was when you left town. It is possible that we could have a slightly higher margin on our side than last year for the important question vote. On the substantive vote, the best guess is that we will have perhaps two votes margin in our favor but events in Africa, mainland China, or elsewhere, could still affect this considerably. Furthermore, since the vote will not come until about December 1 (debate begins Nov. 21), mainland events could take a somewhat clearer turn with unpredictable results on the voting. The fact that the tally is close to last year’s vote does not indicate stability. Several nations have shifted from each side of the question to the other side.
After the IRG meeting today, Sam Berger called me into his office to say that he wanted me to know of a memo being prepared as the result of a meeting held this morning with Joe Sisco, but that it was being very closely held within the Department.2 He said that he had become finally convinced that it was too late under any circumstances for us to shift to a two-China approach at this session, even in extremis. After considerable discussion it was agreed that as a contingency position we would not oppose efforts on the part of friendly nations, such as Canada, Italy or Belgium, to turn to a study group. We would recommend to the Secretary, however, that we be a member of such a study group. (I am very glad to see this change in our position.)
I think this makes sense. It may make some sort of contribution on the right side of the present mainland struggle without incurring just at this unpredictable time some of the risks of a more definitive change in U.S. policy. I hope the Secretary will buy this policy. It is obviously essential [Page 410] that our contingency position, if it becomes that, be closely held, lest it affect disastrously our initial and only overt position.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Jenkins Memos. Secret. Copies were sent to William J. Jorden and Donald Ropa of the NSC staff.↩
- A November 3 memorandum from Sisco to Rusk sets forth three alternatives: continuing the same tactics, supporting dual representation, and supporting a Study Committee. It dismissed the first alternative as ineffective and the second as unacceptable because of the reaction of Taipei and other governments that were publicly committed to support the U.S. position and because Congress and the public were not prepared for such a sudden reversal. The memorandum stated that adoption of a passive role concerning a Study Committee proposal had been considered but that direct U.S. involvement would provide the best assurance of getting acceptable results. A copy is attached to a November 4 memorandum from Sisco to Rusk. (Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM)↩