Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

84. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, April 26, 1966, 1010Z.

1214. For the Secretary and Assistant Secretary Bundy from Ambassador. SOFA. Ref: A. Deptel 1118.² B. Embtels 1200 and 1201.³

1. I am sending you this message, in order to be sure before carrying out instructions contained in para two reftel A,⁴ that the highest levels in Washington concerned not just with SOFA but also with the U.S. position in Vietnam are fully aware of what in my judgment will be the adverse consequences of the position stated in reftel A. I also would like to be sure that ref Embtels, which crossed ref Deptel in transmission, have been considered.

2. Under normal circumstances I would fully concur with the position taken in ref Deptel that the host government should now agree to proceed with an agreement reached after such difficulty. We do not, however, face normal circumstances. The situation here has altered considerably since the SOFA was negotiated and to the Korean mind this is complete justification for a different attitude towards it. Whatever high officials may have said in the past, SOFA as it now stands is not politically acceptable here and the ROKG at least will not see it to their advantage to sign the SOFA and try to get it through the Assembly well before the elections. They have already served notice, both in the press and privately to us, that they do not intend to do so. The argument that similar agreements have been concluded with Germany and China and other arguments in para 2 of ref Deptel will, I am afraid, not be persuasive here, valid as they may appear to us.

3. The mood in Korea today is one of uncertainty and some apprehension insofar as the war in Vietnam is concerned. The recent disturbances and shaky position of the government of SVN, fears as to the consequences of SVN elections, doubts as to what the U.S. would be prepared to settle for in SVN, fanned by incomplete and sometimes distorted press reports about statements by high U.S. Government officials, all are the subject of anxious discussion which in the end come back to Korea’s relationship to the U.S. People are beginning to question whether a further division should be sent this summer in view of the changed situation in VN and fears as to changes in U.S. policy. There seems to be a growing uneasy feeling that the U.S. has somehow got Korea into a dangerous situation and doubt as to whether we are going to stand by to help.

4. Moreover, election time is approaching in ROK and most economic and political decisions, including foreign policy decisions, from here on in will be determined by political, i.e., campaign considerations. U.S.-ROK disagreement over SOFA would very probably supply the “gut” national issue which is thus far lacking. Sovereignty and national prestige is the most sensitive issue in Asia. U.S. reluctance to re-open negotiations and our refusal to accept modifications in criminal jurisdiction provision will be seized upon eagerly by press and opposition and built up as evidence that present ROKG cannot satisfactorily manage ROK relations with U.S. which goes its own way regardless of sacrifices made by ROK to help U.S. in Vietnam. Opposition parties would be supplied with a rallying cry which could easily unite them and with which they could, if they desire, call students into the streets to demonstrate. One can imagine also the glee with which Communist propaganda will seize upon and elaborate this theme in its propaganda to this country. All of this is beyond ROKG’s ability to control and, as we have pointed out, there is real danger that ROKG will feel it must take an initiative.

5. An atmosphere of frustration and exasperation with the U.S. is not an atmosphere conducive to ROK public support for the despatch of further troops to VN. I am not prepared to say that the government will not fulfill its commitment, as President Pak is deeply engaged, but an uproar about U.S.-Korean relations arising out of SOFA would create very real problems for him, particularly if troubles in Vietnam are not satisfactorily resolved and ROK casualty rates begin to mount.

6. As indicated in ref Embtels, we continue to believe that the interests of our servicemen would be fully protected if we are forthcoming with respect to criminal jurisdiction and that other ROK demands can be contained to our satisfaction.⁵

7. My personal conviction and the unanimous judgment of my colleagues, both military and civilian, that if we take the action directed by ref A we will create a situation in this country which at best will leave scars on our whole relationship and be something which will arise constantly to plague us, and at worst could involve a really serious breach in our good relations with this country, possibly anti-American student demonstrations and damage to the ability, perhaps even the desire, of the government to continue its current policy of unwavering support of the U.S.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 15–3 KOR S–US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. The Joint State-Defense message transmitted in telegram 1118 to Seoul, April 22, informed the Embassy that the criminal-jurisdiction article in the SOFA with Korea could not be modified and set forth the reasons on which that decision was based. (Ibid.)
3. In telegrams 1200 and 1201, both April 23, the Embassy argued for reopening the SOFA negotiations to assuage Korean concerns that the current agreement was substandard to SOFAs negotiated with other Asian countries, notably Japan and the Philippines. (Both ibid.)
4. Paragraph 2 of telegram 1118 instructed the Embassy to “inform FonOff we regard negotiation completed and agreement reached fair, balanced, and workable.” Washington’s decision derived from the perception that the current SOFA balanced Korean and U.S. needs and interests and that, although it was a good agreement, there would always be some political opposition to SOFA in Korea with or without further revisions. (Ibid.)
5. Documents submitted by the ROKG requesting renewed SOFA negotiations and containing proposed changes in the criminal-jurisdiction, labor, and claims articles were transmitted in airgram A–467 from Seoul, June 10. (Ibid.)