81. Editorial Note
On February 28, 1966, the Korean Government publicly announced its decision to provide one regiment and one division to Vietnam. The government submitted its request for approval to dispatch additional troops to the National Assembly on March 2. Although conceding uncertainty about winning support for the action from the opposition People’s Party, the Embassy was “reasonably confident” that the majority Democratic Republican Party would pass the resolution. (Telegrams 947, 954, 960, and 965 from Seoul, February 26, March 1, March 2, and March 3, respectively, all in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S)
As the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees of the National Assembly began considering the resolution, leaders of the People’s Party announced their opposition to the request because of concerns that providing more troops would weaken Korea’s defenses, concerns also expressed by members of the government party. In an effort to assuage those fears and buttress U.S. security commitments to Korea, support began to congeal around efforts generated by Assembly members of both parties to revise the United States-Korean Mutual Security Pact as a precondition to dispatching additional troops. The revision called for ending U.S. Constitutional requirements preventing an immediate [Page 172] U.S. response to a conflict in Korea and for prohibiting any decrease in U.S. troop strength in Korea without first obtaining Korean approval. Both the Korean Government and the Embassy attempted to head off the movement by underscoring the totality of the U.S. commitment to Korean security. (Telegrams 965, 970, and 976 from Seoul, March 3, March 4, and March 7, respectively; all ibid.)
Earlier in the year the Department of State had authorized Ambassador Brown to inform the Koreans that the United States would not reduce its military presence without first consulting the Government of the Republic of Korea, if the latter dispatched additional troops to Vietnam. (Telegram 703 to Seoul, January 8; ibid., POL 27 VIET S) But in response to the treaty question, the Department of State notified the Embassy that the United States could not revise the defense treaty with Korea, not only because of constitutionally mandated procedures, but also because the treaty contained the same formulations and standard wording used in all major defense treaties. The proposed revision of the treaty with Korea could call the provision contained in numerous other agreements into question. (Telegram 950 to Seoul, March 10; ibid.) Ambassador Brown provided the Foreign Minister with several letters addressing the security issue and reiterating the totality of U.S. policy toward the defense of Korea. (Airgram A–368 from Seoul, March 24; ibid.)
On March 11 Ambassador Brown submitted to President Pak a letter of appreciation from President Johnson for his decision to send additional troops to Vietnam. The letter was written in an attempt to advance and accelerate approval of the resolution. (Telegram 937 to Seoul, March 8, and telegram 990 from Seoul, March 9; ibid.) After receiving the letter, President Pak noted that approval of the resolution might be delayed because of opposition within the National Assembly, but indicated that the situation “would not delay despatch of troops since military preparations are proceeding according to schedule.” (Telegram 1000 from Seoul, March 11; ibid.)
After a late-night session of intense debate lasting until 3 a.m., the National Assembly voted on the resolution on March 20. The Assembly approved the resolution by a vote of 95 to 27 with 3 abstentions. (Telegram 1046 from Seoul, March 20; ibid.) On June 1 the Korean Minister of National Defense announced that the White Horse division would be sent to Vietnam in August and an additional 5,000-man unit would be furnished to support all Korean troops in Vietnam. He also noted that by October 1966 the Republic of Korea would have 45,000 men in Vietnam. (Telegram 1377 from Seoul, June 3; ibid., POL 27–14 KOR/UN)