Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

68. Memorandum From Vice President Humphrey to President Johnson¹

Washington, January 5, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Korea

In my discussions with President Park of the Republic of Korea, I was told that there had been undue delay in the provision of military assistance during the past year. Furthermore, there was a grave shortage of spare parts. I was further informed that much of the equipment, radar, field pieces, anti-aircraft guns and rifles were of World War II vintage and in a serious state of disrepair. This same message was given to me by the military authorities during my inspection of ROK troops.

I am not in a position to judge the accurateness of this complaint, but I do pass it along for your information and respectfully suggest that an inquiry be made at the Defense Department. If there is delay, then indeed someone should expedite the shipment of the necessary equipment and parts.

There was grave concern in the government circles of Korea that we would be sharply reducing military assistance at the very time that Korea was taking a more active role in Vietnam. The President and the Prime Minister of Korea made a strong plea for offshore procurement from Korea to supply forces in Vietnam. They emphasized first of all that all offshore purchasing for the Korean forces in Vietnam should be made from Korea. They also requested that a sizable portion of offshore procurement for other forces in Vietnam be obtained through Korean sources. Both the President and the Prime Minister and other Cabinet officials expressed concern that the United States might do most of its offshore purchasing from Japan. I assured the Korean officials that these observations would be brought to your attention. The report of Mr. Valenti as to my conversations with President Park and the Prime Minister relates in more detail the substance of the Korean position on procurement and its relationship to additional Korean forces in Vietnam.²

President Park is anxious to be of greater help in Vietnam³ but faces some serious political and economic problems at home. He feels that he could overcome these problems even though 1967 is an election year, if the United States would give special consideration to Korean economic needs by purchasing supplies in Korea and making available the necessary military assistance to further modernize the Korean armed forces. I made it quite clear to President Park and his government that there was no U.S. blank check or open-end account. I urged that he make a specific proposal to our Ambassador so that we had something to talk about and some idea of what the Koreans wanted and needed.⁴ I stressed that it would not be possible for us to estimate Korean needs or offer any effective assistance until we had a proposal from the Korean government. I gather that such will be forthcoming.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Council File, National Security Council Meetings File. No classification marking.
2. Dated January 2. (Ibid., Office of the President File, Valenti, Jack, Memoranda of Conversations—Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, December 1965–January 1966) Memoranda of Humphrey’s three conversations with the President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and other Korean officials, all on January 2, were sent to the Department of State as enclosures to airgram A–255 from Seoul, January 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,POL 27 VIET S)
3. In telegram 682 from Seoul, January 3, reporting on Humphrey’s meetings with Pak and other senior Korean officials, Brown attributed Pak’s willingness to assist the United States in Vietnam to three factors: “a wish to assume leadership role in East Asia, a genuine concern to oppose Communist aggression in Asia in ROK own interest, and a recognition of need to demonstrate further the closeness of the US–ROK relationship.” (Ibid.)
4. In telegram 682 from Seoul, January 3, Brown noted that the United States was “in for a period of bargaining” on the Vietnam troop issue. He indicated that although Pak’s requests have been modest, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister were looking for something more and making the rewards “as large as possible.” (Ibid.)