Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

66. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, December 28, 1965, 0935Z.

657. Additional Troops for Vietnam. Deptel 588.²

1. As is evident already from my talks with the President and the Prime Minister, the main problem facing them in acceding to request for more troops will be the creation of a favorable climate of opinion in Korean Assembly, press and public.

2. U.S. attitude and even more important, U.S. actions, will inevitably exert a strong formative influence, one way or the other, on this climate.

3. Our overriding purpose is to get additional troops and, almost equally important, to get them with as solid a basis of Korean national support as possible. It would not be good for us or for our cause, for example, if these troops were sent by a narrow margin of Assembly approval after bitter debate and in the face of serious press and public criticism or even serious doubt.

4. There are many ways in which we can make our formative influence helpful. Some of these are large scale and dramatic, e.g., increased MAP support, public statements by very high level U.S. officials. But the cumulative effect of a series of smaller actions, or avoidance of action, especially in areas which are currently the focus of Korean public interest, can have an equal and, in some instances, a more solid and perhaps even greater beneficial influence.

5. If for example, over the next few weeks and months there should be a series of favorable procurement actions for SVN, or increased export to U.S. or new DLF loan approvals, or a better textile quota, or avoidance of bad news on use of counterpart, even in relatively small amounts in each case, the psychological effect here would be very constructive.

6. Most helpful at the moment would be a demonstration of U.S. good faith by early arrival of substantial quantities of the military equipment for the three ready reserve divisions (particularly fighting items) which was promised the ROKG when it agreed to send the Tiger division to SVN. Delay in these deliveries has already been the subject of anxious ROKG questions.

7. Much is already being done, e.g., DOD procurement mission, and this has already been helpful. It nevertheless seems to me that we should for the next few months look at every action affecting Korea proposed by any part of our government in terms of its contribution to, or detraction from, the service of this main objective, and how, if possible, such action or inaction can be made to serve, or be kept from hurting, the achievement of that objective. A current small case in point can be found in Embtel 626.³ Another is the “unfunding” of U.S. won accounts (a purely technical matter) which has resulted in a sudden and complete cessation for December of dollar receipts from won conversion for U.S. military and has elicited strongest representations from the DPM today.

8. We are establishing necessary machinery here to try to forward this purpose and hope Washington can do likewise.

9. I would like to add that if the Koreans make this further troop contribution, it will be utterly impossible for them to understand why there can be no preferred treatment for them in matters economic, especially as they relate to SVN. They will be making a contribution in the irreplaceable commodity of human life, and doing so on a scale utterly disproportionate to the contributions of their competitors, particularly Japan. In such case the assurance of equal treatment with these competitors seems small recompense.

10. It seems to me that we are being faced with a political and human problem directly related to a bloody war in which we are deeply committed, to the solution of which our normal rules of commercial policy and peacetime procurement must also make their contribution.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to the Department of Defense, CINCPAC for POLAD, and Saigon.
2. In telegram 588, December 17, the Department of State presented, among other things, the proposed commitments the United States was willing to make to Korea, should additional ROK forces be deployed to Vietnam. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 626 from Seoul, December 22, the Embassy discussed upcoming talks regarding the renewal of a contract between the Department of Defense and the Korea Oil Corporation to supply MAP-financed POL to meet Korean military requirements. (Ibid., DEF 19–8 US–KOR S)