Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

63. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, December 22, 1965, 1135Z.

627. Subject: Additional Korean Troops for South Vietnam.

1. PriMin Chong Il-kwon raised this subject with me at lunch today, indicating he had discussed matter with President Pak and with Minister National Defense. He stated that President Pak, MND and he all agree that ROK should send additional troops we had requested but that US help would be required in handling problems with political opposition and press that would arise when request became public knowledge. I questioned him closely with respect to authoritativeness of his statement, asking on three separate occasions whether this statement represented official response to my conversation with President Pak. On each occasion PriMin responded in the affirmative.

2. Conversation was devoted primarily to discussion of tactics for handling political problems. PriMin said it would be essential, before troop request became public, that either Secretary Rusk or Secretary McNamara come to Korea for consultation with President Pak. He suggested about January 25 for such visit. He said visit needed to assure Korean public of continuing deep concern and support of US leadership for ROKG. Immediately following consultation Secretary could publicly reaffirm US support for Korea’s security, point to concrete measures being taken by US to strengthen ROK forces (e.g., new equipment for divisions), assure public that modernization ROK forces would continue and that MAP program would not decrease in next two years or so, describe plans for augmentation US forces in SVN, and express hope that Korea could make further troop contribution. (PM envisaged that in meantime favorable news could continue emanate from Washington and Saigon on US and GVN procurement from Korea for SVN and augmentation Korean exports.)

3. Immediately following this announcement President would confirm request and convene National Assembly to present authorizing legislation, which it would have secretly prepared in advance. PriMin said he anticipated legislation could be passed before President Pak departs February 7 on his Southeast Asian tour. He expressed view such hurried passage necessary to get legislation passed before public unrest develops during traditional period of food scarcity in late winter and before opposition and its press supporters could organize resistance and mobilize student action. He thought President Pak would have no difficulty in keeping DRP in line, although he admitted some DRP members might make trouble.

4. PriMin said that he foresees two major political problems facing ROKG in coming months. One was the possibility of difficulties, particularly on economic aspects, with administration of Japan-ROK agreements. These might give opposition and press opportunities to attack Pak government. Second was possibility that something might go wrong in Vietnam, where serious reverses could damage prestige of ROKG. He therefore thought it essential that to extent possible effort be made to educate press and opposition assemblymen as to Vietnam situation and US determination before troop request made public. PriMin said in this context he thought it would be extremely useful if the USG could arrange and finance early visits to US and Vietnam by group of about 15 key DRP and opposition assemblymen and to Vietnam by selected group of reporters and editorial writers. Those selected could report to Korean people on actual conditions in US and Vietnam, could be indoctrinated on need for additional forces in present ROK area of responsibility by ROK commanders in SVN, and could generally prepare way for acceptance troop request.

5. In response to foregoing I told him that it might be possible to have Secretary McNamara visit Korea during last week of January² and that we would see what we could do about arranging for visits to US and Vietnam by assemblymen and press people. With respect quid pro quo I gave him essentially same assurances I had given to President Pak but did not go into detail. I told him that US would be as forthcoming as possible and that we would expect detailed discussions of military aspects this subject would take place between MND and General Beach as soon as MND was ready to talk. I concluded this conversation by expressing deep appreciation on behalf of USG and people for the response which he had given me.

6. Comment: I am not completely satisfied with this interview, particularly in view of fact that MND has not mentioned this subject to General Beach, although after his talk with Prime Minister, MND had lengthy discussion with Beach on related subjects. This makes me feel it necessary to confirm personally with President Pak that ROKG position is as stated by PriMin. This I will try to do morning December 24.

7. I also find it difficult to believe that things will go as smoothly as PriMin seemed to indicate. For one thing it appears unlikely that ROKG would be able to push enabling legislation through National Assembly before President Pak’s departure for Southeast Asia. Indeed PriMin seemed to confirm this doubt when he later referred to possibility that assemblymen and newsmen might take suggested trips while President Pak was away. It is also clear that considerable hard bargaining with respect quid pro quo will ensue once MND gets into this act. On the whole, however, PriMin’s reply confirms our feeling that highest levels ROKG wish to respond favorably to our request and that major problems will involve satisfying MND’s demands on quid pro quo and minimizing public and political opposition to request when it is presented to National Assembly. These may be considerable.

8. For tactical reasons, I propose now to wait for approach from MND to General Beach, which I will try to get President to accelerate if I am able to discuss subject with him on Dec. 24, or if not, by raising matter again with Prime Minister, at latest Dec 27. Meanwhile, we are considering how we could assist with brain-washing operation on opposition and press which PriMin suggested and would appreciate any suggestions Department may offer. Would also appreciate soonest indication of whether it would be possible for Secretary McNamara to schedule Seoul visit last week January.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the Department of Defense, Saigon, and CINCPAC.
2. McNamara did not visit South Korea at this time. As part of a previously arranged trip to several Asian countries, Vice President Humphrey was scheduled to visit Seoul January 1–2, 1966. The Embassy advised that since the “request for additional ROK troops is now most important subject involving US/ROK relations” Humphrey should be prepared to discuss the subject when he met with Pak. The Department of State concurred. (Telegrams 628 from Seoul, December 22, and 623 to Seoul, December 23; both ibid.)