Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

40. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, April 26, 1965, 2:51 p.m.

1042. Embtel 1072.² We appreciate desirability giving Pak frank picture our possible future plans, but there are grave drawbacks to telling him now that we may eventually ask for as much as a division.

Basic factor is, as stated in our 1039,³ that we are most anxious avoid any publicity for deployments before they are firmly agreed with GVN and preferably before they actually arrive. We realize that in case of ROK units alerting and shipping arrangements alone would probably lead to necessity for announcement well prior to arrival, and it is for this reason, in part, that we did not visualize ROK RCT, even if fully agreed, closing SVN until mid-June at earliest.

Secondly, if we do go through with proposed additional 2–3 enclaves, we are most anxious to have this appear—as indeed is the fact—as a limited measure to secure particular areas and conduct limited operations from them. Any foreshadowing of much greater deployments to come would jump the gun in view of the very tentative character of our thinking at this point, and would inevitably create the impression that we were simply moving inexorably to a large ground involvement. Obviously, if Pak were to seek Assembly approval for a ROK division, even if he made it clear that it would not be dispatched immediately in toto, it would inevitably lead to conclusion by press and other governments that if ROK was considering a force of this size we ourselves must have in mind something very much greater.

For these reasons it seems to us vital that Pak not seek any Assembly approval for a division at least before the end of June and probably not until we have had a much better chance to evaluate effectiveness of more limited deployments now contemplated. It also seems to us, unless you can be really sure of security factor, that it would be most risky to tell him firmly that we even have in mind the possibility of a division-size ROK combat contribution. If it is humanly possible, we must take this thing one bite at a time in order to avoid most serious consequences in GVN and in world attitudes.

We suppose that part of your problem is that ROK Assembly may recess during summer. We wonder, however, if it could not be recalled if required.

Hence, we would vastly prefer you stick to original instructions while not foreclosing possibility additional contribution might later be requested. Please handle accordingly unless you have reply comments.

Moreover, any publicity even for RCT proposal at this time would be most inopportune. We do not have GVN reaction to any additional deployments and would need to work out details even when and if both GVN and Pak are agreeable in principle. Moreover, exact timing of any public indication—much less formal seeking Assembly approval—will have to be weighed very carefully in total picture of public impact added deployments. Hence, you should make perfectly clear to Pak that we would need to consult very closely with him on future handling and that all publicity must be avoided for now.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Hilliker, and approved by Bundy. Repeated to Saigon.
2. The Embassy in Seoul received confirmation that Washington recognized that a request for ROK forces for Vietnam “might rise to scale of one division (18,000 men) in later stage if required,” although the Koreans were not to be informed of that possibility at present. (Telegram 1040 to Seoul, April 26; ibid.) The Embassy responded in telegram 1072, April 26, that, because the National Assembly would have to approve the dispatch of additional troops, Pak should be informed from the start so that he could decide whether to “seek authority in advance to dispatch up to division-size contingent rather than tackle problem piecemeal.” (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 1039 to Seoul, also sent to Tokyo as telegram 2745, April 25, outlined the approach Lodge should take in his meeting with Pak when raising the question of Korea providing additional troops to Vietnam. Lodge was instructed “to mention to Pak personally that there may arise a possibility that a ROK combat contribution on the order of a regimental combat team (about 4,000 men) would become desirable within the next two months.” (Ibid., POL 27–14 KOREA/UN)