Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

37. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, March 30, 1965, 7 p.m.

931. Ref: Deptel 902.² Subject: ROK Combat Forces for Vietnam.

1. Proposal to dispatch ROK combat division to Vietnam in present circumstances would present problem and involve consideration quite different from those surrounding dispatch of non-combat units. It involves factors which have probably not been fully presented to or even considered by Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won.

2. Sending ROK division to Vietnam would require approval of National Assembly and wide and free-ranging public discussion at a time when ROKG is engaged in major struggle in effort to normalize relations with Japan. This struggle likely to continue for at least two months and possibly longer. It may involve very survival of the government in face of determined opposition effort to create turmoil. We can say with certainty based on recent experience that this proposal would arouse strong objections and require great deal of attention from a govt already harassed.

3. Opposition politicians vigorously opposed dispatch of 2,000 non-combat troops to Vietnam. Their opposition to this new proposal will be even stronger. Opposition press can be counted on to oppose and to introduce strong element of doubt about wisdom of greater Korean participation in Vietnam. This has already begun in comments on news report from Washington of FonMin’s reported offer to Secretary Rusk of further troops. Students, who were not on campus at time of National Assembly debate over ROK IMAF last January, will interject themselves and at least a vociferous minority among them is likely to oppose. Hue and cry will bewilder general public and generate uneasiness and fear of consequences of greater Korean participation in distant undeclared war when known enemy is nearby and their own daily problems appear so difficult. Adding controversy over this issue to other current controversies would weaken government at time when maximum strength is needed for ratification ROK-Japan agreement. Reservations about troop dispatch expressed previously by elements in DRP will be stronger and thus make it more difficult for govt to obtain National Assembly approval for the settlement by simple exercise of its majority.

4. Top leadership of govt feels greater readiness to expand Korea’s contribution than any other sector of Korean society. President Pak, some Cabinet officers, and majority of military leadership are bold in vision and want ROK to play greater role in East Asia. They would in normal circumstances probably be quite prepared to act provided their conditions were satisfied. Nevertheless, we believe even this leadership would hesitate to take on task of sending combat division to Vietnam at this time. Their plate is full and before any more is added at least ROK-Japan issue must be out of way.

5. We therefore conclude time is not now propitious.

6. It would moreover in our judgment be undesirable to take up question with ROKG before or during Pak visit to Washington if, as now seems likely, ROK-Japan settlement not yet ratified and visit viewed primarily as aid to ROKG in getting ratification. In addition to certainty that proposal would lead to press, problem of negotiating suitable package for Pak on that occasion would be greatly complicated by US request for combat troops, especially since if request were made initial response would probably be affirmative but be followed immediately by second thoughts and stipulation of long list of conditions on points covered below. We recognize that it might seem strange if request were presented to ROKG soon after Pak returned without having been discussed during Washington visit. Nevertheless, on balance we think it better to defer raising matter with ROKG until after ratification, recognizing that Washington’s judgment on this will be made in light of relative importance attached in short term to ROK-Japan settlement on one hand and reenforcement in Vietnam on other. If by chance ratification already in hand, Pak visit would be logical time to raise matter with ROKG.

7. In more normal political situation that is likely to obtain after ratification of ROK-Japan settlement, our present judgment is that ROKG, as distinguished from public, would wish to respond affirmatively to US request for combat division for Vietnam. We expect govt’s position will be strengthened by successful conclusion Japanese settlement, although immediate aftermath will probably see Cabinet shakeup. Koreans remain fundamentally anti-Communist, with some pride in their willingness to stand at side of a country threatened by common enemy. It is not difficult for Koreans to recognize enemy even when he is distant and they do remember being helped in their own adversity. Many volunteers among veterans of ROK Army are ready to come forward, partly from a spirit of adventure and partly in hope of useful employment and financial gain. Even after ratification opposition would still oppose, as they did last January, and there would be nationwide discussion and debate, but with assurances and help from US (extent of these would be vitally important), proper preparation of public opinion, and good management, govt would stand sufficient chance of getting National Assembly approval to justify the effort.

8. In official and public consideration this action, there would be concern over possibility of greater danger along DMZ, where status quo would appear subject to change with Korean engagement in open conflict against Communist elements elsewhere. We agree with Dept’s estimate that chances of all-out conflict on border between North and South Korea are not great. We do not exclude possibility of North Korean demonstration along DMZ (e.g. more fire fights, artillery fire on Paeng Yan-do or even large scale bombardment) to generate fear, inspire movement of refugees, etc. Whether danger is actually greater or not, many Koreans would raise question whether their country’s actions in Vietnam might not endanger their own country’s peace.

9. There would be some concern over legality sending combat troops to Vietnam in absence treaty obligation. This was raised by opposition and some newspapers during debate over sending non-combat troops and can be expected to be repeated with call for some form of formal treaty relationship which would sanction such intervention.

10. Many Koreans would question their ability share burden of collective security when their own problems are great and their progress is slow. They would question need for greater Korean role, when other free nations in Asia have not yet made contribution equivalent to their own. This questioning would be directed particularly at Japan’s failure to help, at the wisdom of sterilizing the Chinese nationalists, at slowness of Philippines to act, and at the relatively modest contributions of Australia and New Zealand. Some responsible Korean military figures might question publicly (as they already have privately, e.g. commander of advance party for ROK IMAF and General Kim Chong-O) feasibility of employing Korean combat units in guerrilla war in foreign environment, under difficult tactical and logistical conditions.

11. Material aspects will loom large in Korean calculations, both official and private. Persuasion and appeals to rally to common cause will be useful, but special inducements on large scale will be necessary. Pressure will not work and should not be attempted. Volunteer aspect would need to be stressed to minimize complaints that comscripts being sent abroad to fight in undeclared war.

12. ROKG would seek firm assurances US forces in Korea would not be reduced and revision of US–ROK Mutual Security Treaty to secure US commitment along lines NATO formula as insurance against any increase in threat from North. Any proposal that one US division be shifted from Korea as part of build-up in Vietnam would be vigorously opposed and would increase effectiveness of opposition arguments that Korean interests were being sacrificed.

13. ROKG would expect all expenses of operation to be borne by US. This would include transportation, logistical requirements, special overseas allowances, and any other cost factors involved. For force of say 21,000 men this would be substantial amount. ROKG will almost certainly ask that division sent to Vietnam be replaced as soon as possible by activating a new division at US expense.

14. To bolster their defenses against what they would consider as substantially increased risk to their own security, ROKG would vigorously seek more military support to fill budgetary and military deficiencies, including suspension MAP transfer, increased military budget support, and expanded MAP levels. ROKG would expect to get substantial benefit from sale of goods to Vietnam under US aid financed program, and from maintenance and repair services which Korea can supply. This subject has been getting considerable attention in ROKG ever since their troops went to Vietnam. ROKG would also expect its active role in Vietnam to be reflected in US economic aid levels in Korea. Their argument would be such—if Korea is to help abroad it needs to be strengthened internally. It is not yet ready to bear extra burdens.

15. To sum up, we see formidable proposal [opposition?] and long drawn-out debate over proposal. Present time is particularly difficult, but under any foreseeable circumstances govt will have trouble and public opinion is certain to be divided. Extensive inducements will be required and cost will be great. But if approached after ROK-Japan ratification and with assurances of generous support from US, our present best judgment is that govt response is likely to be affirmative. National Assembly approval can be hoped for but cannot be assured.

16. We believe that question also has implications for the long-run psychology of US–ROK relationship which we are examining and which may affect judgments expressed above pro or contra. For example public debate of this question may give Koreans greater feeling of equality and partnership with the US, helping to compensate for age-old inferiority complex and fear of Japan, and contribute to a new sense of national confidence. On other hand, many Koreans may begin to question whether US–ROK relationship evolving into one in which ROK becomes tool which US uses for own political and strategic purposes instead of independent object of US assistance and support. These possible effects involve larger question of how both we and Koreans envisage not only their relationship with the US but their own changing role in Asia and the speed of that transition.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis.
2. Not found.