367. Memorandum of Conversation1
Washington, November
29, 1965.
SUBJECT
- ROK and U.S. Relations with Japan
PARTICIPANTS
- Foreign Minister Tong Won Lee, Republic of Korea
- Ambassador Hyun Chul Kim, Korean Embassy
- Mr. Nam Ki Lee, American Section Chief, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- The Secretary
- Mr. William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
- Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown
- Mr. David H. Popper, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs
- Mr. Benjamin A. Fleck, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs
ROK-Japan Normalization
- 1.
- The Secretary said he had great personal respect for the role played by the Foreign Minister in the negotiations for normalization of relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan. The Foreign Minister had displayed a high degree of wisdom and courage. The Secretary said he understood that the ratification instruments would soon be exchanged. He asked if the Minister saw any obstacles to good relations between the two governments arising in the near future.
- 2.
- The Minister replied that the instruments of ratification were scheduled to be exchanged on December 22 in Seoul. He foresaw no real problems arising. As he had mentioned to Mr. Bundy that morning,2 the negotiations were now over and the Korean people were trying to forget the sad memories of the past. Everything now depends on the sincerity and spirit of cooperation of each side. He said good relations with Japan were important to Korea but the Korean people are very sensitive and there would be trouble if the Japanese were too selfish.
- 3.
- The Secretary said that in view of the history of the last 60 years and the proximity of Korea, a small country, to Japan, a large country, the sensitivity of the Korean people is understandable. He pointed out that the United States has encountered similar feelings from time to time on the part of the Canadians and Mexicans. However, today’s Japan is not the same Japan as that with which the Korean people had [Page 798] been acquainted prior to 1945. Great changes have taken place in Japan since then.
- 4.
- The Minister replied that he agreed and that his government, as well as Mr. Bundy and Ambassador Brown, has made great efforts to convince the Korean people of this truth. However, it is now up to Japan to demonstrate sincerity in its dealings with Korea.
- 5.
- The Secretary asked whether the Minister was suggesting that Japan adopt a “low posture” toward the Republic of Korea. The Minister replied that his government only wished the Japanese to adopt a “normal posture.” The Secretary said the United States would help, when appropriate.
Korean Proposal for Tripartite Consultations
- 6.
- The Foreign Minister stated that the United States is the big brother of the Republic of Korea and of Japan. The two younger brothers have quarreled with each other in the past. It might be useful if the elder brother would now bring the younger brothers into a family atmosphere to talk over family matters. He said he was not asking for a commitment or for institutionalized meetings. He said that his government is confident that U.S. policy toward the Republic of Korea will not change as a result of normalization of ROK-Japan relations.
- 7.
- The Secretary replied that in view of the great span of Korean and Japanese culture and history, the Minister was extremely flattering to speak of the United States as an elder brother. He said the Minister was quite right in assuming that there would be no change in U.S. policy. The United States has an unlimited commitment in Korea. If the United States Government were to relinquish any of its responsibilities in Korea, they would be turned over to the Republic of Korea and to no one else.
- 8.
- The Secretary went on to say that the effect of World War II on the Japanese had been radically different than its effect on the Koreans. The Japanese Government had renounced the use of force and had prohibited the establishment of armed forces. It was politically impossible for the Japanese Government to emulate the example set by the ROK Government in Viet-Nam. Japan was only gradually assuming the responsibilities appropriate to a country of its size and strength. The United States is encouraging it to do so, but the process will take a little time.
- 9.
- The Minister recalled that he personally had told Japanese Prime Minister Sato that it is time for Japan to share some of the responsibilities of the United States in Asia. Sato had agreed but had said that there are legal and domestic difficulties in the way. The Secretary remarked that we have been encouraged by recent Japanese actions such as the decision to participate in the Asian Development Bank.
Foreign Ministers Conference
- 10.
- The Foreign Minister recalled that a year ago he had invited the Foreign Ministers of 10 Asian nations to attend a Foreign Ministers Conference in Seoul. Most replies had been favorable but the Japanese had adopted a negative attitude toward the proposal. He believed, however, that the Japanese attitude was being modified. Ambassador Kim Tong-cho had recently reported from Tokyo that the Japanese are now indicating an interest in participating in the conference. He said in his view the conference should not discuss specific problems. His idea in proposing the conference was to have Asian Foreign Ministers sit down together and hold a general discussion of Asian affairs and seek methods of cooperation.
- 11.
- The Secretary asked if the Minister had any date in mind for convening the conference. The Minister replied that he was going to be talking with Japanese Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Shiina in Tokyo on his way back to Seoul. He intended to consult with them concerning a specific date and obtain their views regarding what type of conference should be held. He believed their desires should be carefully considered.
- 12.
- The Secretary observed that some subjects can be discussed more effectively if the United States is not present. The Minister replied that his government would remain highly dependent on continued U.S. support to make the conference successful.