Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

327. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, December 17, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Pueblo Negotiations

State of Play

At the 26th meeting last night (Washington time), the North Koreans accepted “in principle” our latest proposal, a “pre-repudiated apology”. General Woodward passed to General Pak the text of the statement (Tab A) which Woodward will read into the record just before signing the North Korean document (Tab B).² General Pak, who had just accepted the concept of such a repudiatory statement, did not raise any objections to this text. Prime Minister Chung had been briefed on our proposal and raised no objection.

Procedural details remain to be settled. There will have to be at least one more meeting (probably Wednesday evening) and perhaps several. The possibility of some hang-up remains. The North Koreans may press us to modify our statement, for example. But it looks as though the men will be free before Christmas.

Next Steps

The scenario is fairly well fixed up to the point when the crew is released. Our important problems will be to explain what has happened to the American public and the world.

At the time of release we will publish both the North Korean document and our statement repudiating its contents. We will be prepared to elaborate to the press why we agreed to resolve the matter through these two obviously incompatible documents and what the North Korean acceptance of our statement implies about the truth of their allegations. A brief statement should probably be issued at this point on behalf of the President welcoming the release but not going into the details of the arrangement.

As quickly as possible, we will seek confirmation from Captain Bucher and the crew that there was no intrusion and that their confessions were extorted. If possible, Captain Bucher will immediately make a brief statement to this effect to the press in Korea. We will then brief the press here in detail on the numerous inconsistencies in the North Korean “evidence”, explaining how we have been so confident they were forgeries. (If Captain Bucher says the ship did intrude, we will have to consider what public statement to make, taking into account evidence from other officers, etc.)

We will then have to decide, in the light of information received from the crew, what portion of the draft White Paper should be made available to the press. We may wish to publish excerpts from the actual negotiating record, or we may prefer to give priority to comments by crew members on their experience.

As soon as medical checks have been made the crew will be flown to San Diego for reunion with their families and for detailed debriefings.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Nodis.
2. Tabs A and B attached but not printed. The text of Tab A is the same as paragraph 12, Document 325. Tab B is the same as paragraph 3, Document 306.