305. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State1

5835. Subject: Summary of Fifteenth Senior MAC Members Meeting at Panmunjom, April 22, 1968. Ref: State 147513.2

1.
Communist acceptance of today’s meeting was not received until 0800 hrs today. Meeting began at 1100 hrs and ended at 1236.3
2.
RAdm Smith opened with statement contained reftel and handed Pak draft of receipt as instructed.
3.
Pak responded with reference to Smith’s statements at 14th meeting, characterizing request for return of crew on basis US proposal as “shameless demand” and characterizing proposal itself as “nothing but practice of phrase-making to deceive others.” Referring to legality of Pueblo activities under 1907 Hague Convention, Pak said US side can never justify criminal acts of Pueblo under international law. Continued with usual charge that Pueblo was armed spy ship seized while conducting espionage after intrusion into territorial waters of DPRK on mission to detect important secrets and that crew are spies caught in “flagrent delict” (sic). Charged that Pueblo disguised itself as “oceanographic electronic research ship,” stealthily intruded into territorial waters, and tried to hide its identity by responding that it was “hydrographer” [Page 682] in answer to NK naval signals. Recited list of evidence which NK has provided and repeated charge that US attempting to deny “grim reality under all sorts of unreasonable pretexts.” Said such attitude is inhumane act by which US side abandons moral duty to grant, by apologizing, petition of crew to enable them return US as early as possible and to realize fervent desire of waiting families and relatives. Pak then offered to show film which he said would actually show whether confessions of crew had been made under duress. After again deriding US proposal, Pak said it would be miscalculation if US side wants to get something on basis thereof. Ended by saying NK side had put forth concrete proposal for practical solution and fact that question remains unsettled is because of US persistence in maintaining unreasonable position.
4.
Foregoing read from prepared statement. Pak then added statement, which he had written following Smith’s presentation, acknowledging that he had received draft receipt, commenting that there no difference between receipt and “so-called proposal” of US side, and ending “however, I reserve right to answer at next meeting to the draft as well as to your statement today.”
5.
Smith responded that he did not desire to view film but asked Pak to give or lend him copy. He then stated that US side had, as Pak requested at last meeting, written out an appropriate document which would make it possible to settle issue. If NK side did not find this satisfactory, it incumbent upon Pak to present document which NK would consider acceptable. Smith then proposed conclusion of meeting.
6.
During next interval Pak anxiously asked his assistant whether Smith had mentioned responsibility for calling next meeting. When he received copy of Smith’s statement, he immediately looked at it to see whether mention made of next meeting.
7.
Pak then reiterated that NK side had made perfectly clear what kind of apology has to be made to have crew returned and that it completely US side’s business to make that apology and submit document in writing. He indicated unwillingness or inability to lend copy of film and asked again whether Smith wanted to see it “at this place.”
8.
Smith replied he did not wish to see film and again requested copy. Pak responded he had no intention “to positively ask” Smith to view film and repeated that film fully shows that crew confessed voluntarily under no restriction and is receiving humanitarian treatment instead of being treated as spies. Had Smith seen film, he would have admitted that his assertion regarding confessions under duress is inconsistent with facts. Smith’s refusal reveals fear of having unwarrantedness of US position exposed by truth. Ended by warning Smith not to repeat again remarks that crew confessed under duress.
9.
Comment: Session ended with question of who would call next meeting left unsettled. Pak did not volunteer to call next meeting and was apparently upset by Smith’s failure to seek understanding on this question.
10.
While NK position appeared firm at this meeting, Pak’s tone was comparatively mild; he made no threats of punishment; and he did not even object to use of “North Korea” in draft receipt.
Porter
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Immediate;Nodis; Cactus.
  2. Document 304.
  3. Telegram 5836 from Seoul, April 22, transmitted the verbatim text of the meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)