Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, March 9, 1968, 1856Z.

127735. Offer to express regret after release of crew and if impartial inquiry discloses violation of NK waters has now twice been refused and Pak has twice hinted that if stalemate persists NK may take “other steps,” presumably trial and/or punishment of crew.

We are considering next steps, among them the following proposal:

1) At next meeting Smith should try to pin Pak down on fact that crew will in fact be released without trial or punishment concurrently with expression of regret and assurance that US ships will continue to be ordered to stay out of 12 mile limit.

2) If Pak officially confirms this we would then propose to express regret at time of release “for any hostile acts contrary to international law which may have been committed by the USS Pueblo.”

(Obviously there is an infinity of variations on this theme which could be considered in drafting our expression of regret.)

3) Immediately upon release of the crew we would publish our refutation of the NK “evidence” together with a blast at North Koreans for both their duplicity and their series of illegal and aggressive actions. This might give significant comfort to ROKs.

We recognize that almost any variation of this formula would cause difficulties with the ROKs, as it would for us here. We recognize also that North Koreans may well not accept any such formula and ultimately face us with choice between a helicopter type of statement and impasse.²

We would appreciate your comments on this proposal, your suggestions as to any variations in it which would make it more palatable to the ROKs and any alternative courses of action which you may wish to propose.³

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Priority;Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Brown, cleared by Walsh and Katzenbach, and approved by Brown.
2. The Department of State prepared variations of the wording of a conditional apology based on the helicopter case in the event that course was adopted. (Memorandum from Brown to Katzenbach, March 7; ibid.)
3. In telegram 4798 from Seoul, March 10, Porter replied that the proposed statements were generally acceptable and should be tried. He agreed that the approach would displease the South Koreans, but noted “ROK displeasure should not be controlling factor at this point, and we agree that if one is possible, a tough, post-release statement would ease matters.” (Ibid.) After reflecting further, however, Porter submitted a more pessimistic view of the approach, cautioning that North Korean demands for an apology and an admission of wrongdoing from the United States could have unforeseen and completely unacceptable ramifications. (Telegram 4851 from Seoul, March 12; ibid.)