Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

286. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 26, 1968, 1405Z.

2913. Ref: State 120291.²

1. I saw Gromyko at 1430 today and made oral demarche per reftel.

2. Gromyko confirmed receipt verbatim transcripts Panmunjom meetings which had been given to Dobrynin and wondered if I could summarize to him proceedings last meeting. This connection, it became obvious that some confusion exists in Soviet mind re number of private meetings held, since Kornienko, who also present, said they had received transcripts of eight meetings and thought another, ninth, meeting had taken place on February 21. In particular, Gromyko wondered whether we had answered all questions put forward by North Koreans and whether any progress had been made.

3. I said I did not have report on last meeting with me, but noted North Koreans had demanded apology before release of ship and crew and rejected our offer conduct impartial inquiry on our own. Now we intended offer impartial investigation by completely outside body.

4. Gromyko said that on basis information Soviets had from different sources he could say little at this time. If he spoke at length, he was afraid that would result in repetition of what had been said in Kosygin’s message and his own statement to me earlier. He stressed Soviets hoped very much problem would be settled, the sooner the better. Soviets not sure U.S. using all possibilities. He said he had noted in my statement assertion that detention had been illegal; in fact, entire U.S. position seemed to be based on this assertion. He did not wish dwell at length on this point but wanted to state that Soviet views on it as stated before still valid.³

5. I said we believed disagreement may be result of each side’s basing itself on different facts. Therefore, we making offer of impartial investigation those facts. As I had noted in my oral statement, it difficult see what more we could do. In any event, we could not rely on statements by other side or other statements which we doubt had been made voluntarily.

6. Asking rhetorically if U.S. would agree to impartial investigation of U.S. statements re situation in other parts of world, Gromyko said proposition would not satisfy other side. He wondered whether North Koreans had accepted proposal. I explained we had not yet made this offer, but intended to do so at next meeting. Gromyko said question arose what could be regarded as impartial. After all, past U.S. actions in Korea had been under UN label but UN had had nothing to do with them. I stressed we meant an impartial investigation which should be acceptable to North Koreans.

7. Gromyko said he was sure we knew Soviets wanted problem resolved as soon as possible. I said we believed Soviets rational people, and we also thought the sooner this dangerous situation resolved the better for everyone. As to Gromyko’s remarks re impartiality, we did not exclude possibility facts might be against us but we prepared accept results impartial investigation.

8. Gromyko said main thing was for U.S. to tell its people not to engage in this sort of activity; as experience had shown, such activity might result in precarious situation. I pointed out our crews had their instructions to stay out of territorial waters.

9. Comment: Although Gromyko was cautious in his reaction, I believe he was impressed by position we are taking and would guess that Soviets will at least recommend if not urge North Koreans to accept.

Thompson

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Nodis; Cactus.
2. Document 285.
3. The Soviet view was also repeated in a letter from Kosygin to Prime Minister Wilson written in response to a British appeal that the Soviets exert their influence with the North Koreans to resolve the crisis. (Telegram 6716 from London, February 26; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)