Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

278. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Korean Task Force (Berger) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, February 16, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Next Steps in Light of the Seventh Closed Meeting

Since no progress was made at the Seventh Closed Meeting held yesterday afternoon at Panmunjom, I believe the following steps are now in order:

1. Aerial Reconnaissance—I have sent you a separate memorandum today recommending that you approve the flying of a Black Shield mission at the first opportune moment.²

2. Approach the Soviets—We do not know how fully the North Koreans have informed the Soviets of the closed talks. We therefore propose that Ambassador Bohlen pass to Ambassador Dobrynin verbatim transcripts of all seven meetings. These transcripts might be accompanied by a letter from you to Gromyko to be delivered by Dobrynin (Chip’s suggestion).³

We are preparing a draft for Chip to look at. Its general line would be:

a. We have abided by the Soviets advice;

b. We have not been belligerent and have kept the lid on in the United States and South Korea;

c. We have stopped further deployments and turned the Enterprise around;

d. We have direct dealings with North Korea and have had seven meetings;

e. We have not had the slightest indication from the North that they are in any hurry to turn over the crew, and they have made clear they have no intention of ever turning over the vessel;

f. We have reached the end of what we can say and concede;

g. Finally, that Mr. Vance has returned and confirms reports from our Ambassador that a very dangerous mood exists in South Korea, and continued raids across the DMZ or raids against the South could inflame the situation, and produce an even graver problem.

h. That we want the Soviet authorities to know where matters stand.

3. Request for Return of Dead and Wounded—We believe that this step should be deferred at least until after we have seen what results may be produced by the proposed approach to the Soviets.

4. Diplomatic Moves—We are preparing a circular telegram to a number of posts reviewing recent developments in Korea for their information and as a basis for answering inquiries.⁴

5. Next Meeting—Sit tight and wait. If NK’s ask for meeting, we listen and rest on past representations and authorizations.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Nodis.
2. A handwritten notation by Read states: “Approved by S 3 pm 2/16. BHR”
3. A handwritten notation by Read states: “Bohlen letter and verbatim of 6th meeting delivered to Dobrynin on 2/15.” Copies of that and subsequent letters are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US.
4. Paragraph no. 5 was handwritten by Read. Telegram 117319 to 30 embassies and missions, February 17, contained a summary of the status of the Pueblo crisis. (Ibid.)