Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

190. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas¹

Washington, April 13, 1968, 1706Z.

CAP 80808. Following are summary briefing notes for Honolulu meeting with President Park. We shall have a big black book with us on Monday.

Major Topics

Park has three things on his mind:

A. Your personal decision² and its effect on US policy in Asia.

B. Korean defense and other problems.

C. The Viet-Nam situation and negotiations.

A. US Policy in Asia

Park has shown great unhappiness over your personal decision and has even expressed the feeling that he should have been consulted, as an old and true friend. Above all, he fears that without your leadership the US may abandon the Asian policies it has been following.

Thus, he would deeply appreciate your full comment on the political situation at home and what it means for our policy in Asia.

B. Korean Problems

1. Retaliation for further North Korean incidents. Although the North Koreans have not engaged in significant incidents since mid-February (when an upsurge did occur last year), Park and all the Koreans remain anxious. You will recall that Park pressed Vance very hard indeed for a general undertaking that we would join him in immediate retaliation in kind. He strongly implied the ROKs would go it alone if we did not join.

Suggest you stick to Vance’s position—that we are prepared for joint discussion in the light of the facts of each case. However, we cannot get away from the fact that any reprisals could build up rapidly and even threaten major hostilities. You understand how the Koreans feel, but they must reckon that any major hostilities are not in their interest any more than ours, and that, in view of our major responsibility to help in their defense, we must be fully consulted.

2. Building Up ROK Defenses. Park will probably describe significant and recognized defects in the equipment of his armed forces and counter-infiltration agencies. We are in fact proceeding rapidly under the MAP program, and have worked out agreement on the uses for the $100 million pending supplemental appropriation. These take into account his expressed desires.³ In addition, we have now moved approximately 150 US aircraft to Korea.

Suggest you be prepared to go over these actions, on which we will have details.

3. Maintenance of US forces in Korea. Park may request assurance that US forces, including the additional aircraft, will not be withdrawn from Korea without his consent. We have told them many times that we have no plan to reduce the general level of our ground forces—by implication as long as they have forces in Viet-Nam. We have given no assurance on the additional aircraft.

Suggest you repeat that we have no plan to reduce our ground forces under present circumstances, but avoid going further than promising full consultation both on the aircraft and on any later plan concerning ground forces.

4. Amendment of Defense Treaty. Park and other Koreans have pressed us for an amendment of the treaty to make it automatic in the event of aggression. They have drawn a parallel with declarations we have made in the Philippines—that an attack there would necessarily involve our forces at the outset.

Suggest you point out flatly that any amendment of the treaty is out of the question, and that any declaration would have the same Senate problems. At the same time, you can tell them flatly that they can count on us if aggression actually takes place.

5. 16-Nation Declaration. Park and other Koreans have pressed us to join them in getting a reaffirmation of the declaration made in 1953 by 16 nations—that they would act in the event of aggression and that hostilities would not necessarily be confined to Korean territory. We have told them that we ourselves fully support that declaration, but that others—such as the French and even the British—would not go along with reaffirming it today. We have pointed out that, in the absence of unanimity or very close to it, a strong effort to get reaffirmation would be a net minus.

Suggest you stick to this position. (Our soundings, even with such as the Thai, confirm our fears that we don’t have the votes.)

6. Pueblo Case. As you know, Park is worried that our private meetings could imply recognition of the North Korean regime. He is worried that we may go too far in the direction of apology. And he regrets that we did not take tougher action after the seizure.

Suggest you calm his fears about recognition—tell him that we will continue to keep him fully informed—and be prepared to review with him our proposed conditional apology, to which he has not objected. Repeat at the same time that we are not going to apologize for any alleged actions which we cannot independently confirm.

As to more forceful action, suggest that you note that we have examined many actions, but have concluded that little ones would be mere pinpricks, and that any major action (for example, against the North Korean Air Force) would almost certainly mean major hostilities. He understands this bind, even though he does not like it.

C. Viet-Nam Issues

1. Additional ROK Forces. Thieu has now formally asked the Koreans for more forces. We have been discussing a light division with them since last fall, and also 5,000 additional civilians.

Park is prepared to discuss these matters, but does not want them in the communique—and we have agreed.

We are uncertain at this point what position to recommend. Both the 5,000 civilians and the light division make sense from a military standpoint, and would have major political advantages for us. However, the DOD tentatively thinks that providing for equipment for these forces may cut across our top priority for ARVN, at least this summer. We need to hammer this out before you leave.

2. General Situation. Park has just had an optimistic report on the military situation from his own General Chae. He will want to compare notes across the board.

3. Negotiations and ROK Participation. We have assured the Koreans that they will be fully consulted both in contacts and talks. They have no plan to be at the site of contacts, but will certainly send a representative to the site of the talks and will be looking for some form of participation at that stage. We have not yet discussed with them our position during the contacts, nor have we gone into any detail on our substantive position in the talks.

Suggest that:

A. You be prepared to go over the instructions to Ambassador Harriman fully, but without showing him the actual document (which does not refer to ROK participation being nailed down in the contacts).

B. You assure him categorically that our position in the talks will be based on the Manila communique and the 14 points. We stand on the Geneva Accords for both Viet-Nam and Laos, and on conditions for free choice in the South.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel [Meeting with Park], April 1968. Secret.
2. Reference is to the President’s decision not to seek reelection.
3. The $100 million supplemental-aid package approved by the Embassy, the Korean Task Force, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense consisted of an F–4D squadron, small arms for the homeland reserve force, support for the Korean National Police, and M–16 rifles for designated counterinfiltration units. (Memorandum from Warnke to Clifford, March 11; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 091.3 MAP) Differences between Pak and his Defense Minister over the proposed package led to the latter’s dismissal from office. Documentation on the internal controversy and the aid package is ibid. and National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL 15–1 KOR S; POL 33–6 KOR N–US; POL 7 US/VANCE; DEF 19 US–KOR S; and DEF 19–8 KOR S.