Office of the Historian

172. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Commander of United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel)1

Honolulu, February 10, 1968, 0400Z.

100400Z. A. COMUSKOREA KRA 0513/091337Z Feb 68;/2 B. CINCPAC 030154Z Feb 68 (Genser).3

1.
In various dispatches, the latest of which is Ref A, you have expressed a need to inform the ROKs of our strategy in the present situation. In paragraph 5 of Ref A you indicate that you believe US [Page 362] military contingency planning as expressed by CINCPAC in Ref B is fine but can find in it no inkling of a strategic concept you could express to ROKs.
2.
In the wealth of dispatches regarding the current situation, which are too numerous to tabulate, it would seem to me that our strategy is clear. I will give it to you briefly as I see it. The United States intends to accomplish the return of the Pueblo crew by diplomatic means without becoming embroiled in a second front war in Korea. We also hope to have the Pueblo itself returned through diplomatic means, although return of the ship is less important than return of the crew. We do not intend to take any military course of action for return of the Pueblo crew because we know of no action that offers any promise of getting the Pueblo crew back alive. The buildup of air and naval units is designed to support our diplomatic efforts while at the same time increasing our readiness.
3.
You have not been permitted to discuss our strategy with the ROKs because such discussion would run the risk of upsetting our careful and deliberate course of action. When the United States decides to use its military force, if it does, you will be notified in time that you may further notify the ROKs. Until that time you will need to keep higher levels of the ROK Government calmed down to the best of your ability.
4.
The United States does not want any unilateral action by the ROKs which would upset negotiations for return of the Pueblo crew or involve the United States in armed action in Korea. It should be further apparent that United States Armed Forces are fully employed in Vietnam and that people of the United States are not prepared to see their country involved in a second war.
5.
I am sure you realize as I do that we have no intention of allowing the ROKs to get us involved in a war of their choosing, and we expect to control the situation to insure that they don’t. Our participation in any armed action that they start is not automatic. One of your greatest chores at the moment is to keep things calmed down and under control and I realize perfectly that you are not able to convey much information to the ROKs that will assist you in satisfying them.
6.
US strategy as I have outlined it to you in the paragraphs above is not the result of any specific guidance from the JCS but rather my own estimate.
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Military Cables, Vol. II, February 1968 to March 1968. Top Secret; Noforn; Eyes Only. Repeated to Wheeler who passed it to Rostow, Rusk, Helms, and to each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.↩
  2. Document 168.↩
  3. Not found.↩