Office of the Historian

154. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson1

Washington, February 5, 1968.

SUBJECT

  • Airlift of Counterinsurgency Equipment

General Bonesteel requested that certain priority items contained in the “counter-infiltration package” developed by his command in coordination with the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff be airlifted to Korea. Ambassador Porter endorsed this recommendation, and Secretary McNamara has authorized this air delivery on a priority basis equal to that of shipments to Viet-Nam. The Services are working on this requirement on a priority basis. The majority of this equipment will arrive in Korea by February 15, or by the date on which later delivery was requested.

In addition, procurement and delivery actions are underway for the following items of equipment for ROK forces. (These items were discussed with President Pak and MND Kim in relation to discussions regarding additional ROK deployments to Viet-Nam.)2

1.
A $32.3 million “counter-infiltration package.” General Bonesteel requested, and Secretary McNamara authorized, air shipment of certain items in this package on a priority equal to that of equipment going to Viet-Nam. The Services are working on this requirement on a priority basis. The majority of this equipment will arrive in Korea by 15 February or by the date on which delivery was requested.
2.
Two destroyers for the ROK Navy. One destroyer from the Naval Reserve Fleet is being readied for delivery to the ROKs by 30 April. A second destroyer from the “mothball fleet” will be delivered to the ROKs in not more than 12 months.
3.
An 8mm Howitzer battalion, to be delivered this spring.
4.
Equipment and ongoing support for the “CI” battalion the ROKs intend to activate.

In addition, consideration is being given to the following actions to strengthen the military posture of allied forces in Korea:

1.
Provide the ROK Army with full authorized equipment and ammunition (probably full cost of $200 million of which roughly $130 million might be a MAP supplemental).
2.
Increase the effectiveness of the land barrier across the demilitarized zone in Korea and its seaward extension (could cost up to $150 million depending on the extent, density, and sophistication of the barrier).
3.
Improve roads, railroads and other lines of communication, and munitions and material depots in South Korea ($50 million could be usefully spent).
4.
Reduce vulnerability of aircraft and airbases in Korea (shelter 180 U.S. and 180 Korean aircraft for $50 million).
5.
Give South Korea 25–50 F–4 fighters for air defense at a cost of $75–150 million.
6.
Deploy 5,000 U.S. soldiers in addition to the approximately 520,000 Korean and 50,000 U.S. soldiers there now.
7.
Increase ammunition immediately available to land and air forces in Korea (about $250 million).

Nicholas deB Katzenbach
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ib, Part. A. Secret. Attached to a February 5 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, transmitting this memorandum as well as a February 5 letter from Warnke to Rostow on the same topic. Rostow’s memorandum indicates the President saw it.↩
  2. This and the following paragraphs are virtually identical to the text of the February 5 letter from Warnke to Rostow cited in footnote 1.↩