Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

133. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 13, 1967.

SUBJECT

• North Korean Harassment and U.S. Commitments

PARTICIPANTS

• Korean Foreign Minister Choe Kyu-ha
• Ambassador Dong Jo Kim
• The Secretary
• Samuel D. Berger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian & Pacific Affairs
• Benjamin A. Fleck, Country Director for Korea

North Korean Harassment

The Foreign Minister stated that North Korean harassment of the ROK and UN troops along the DMZ was taking place on a large scale and that infiltration of the ROK further south by North Korean agents was a serious problem. When asked by the Secretary to explain North Korean motives, Choe replied that he thought the North Koreans were attempting to accomplish two objectives. The first was to slow down the rate of economic progress in the ROK and the second was to stimulate tension within the country.

The Secretary asked whether any changes had been noticed in the deployment of the North Korean armed forces. Choe replied that new airfields were being built in the North and that the North Korean forces were being equipped with new Soviet equipment.²

Modernization of ROK Forces

In view of the North Korean activities which he had just described, the Foreign Minister urged greater effort in improving the capability of the ROK forces to counter the North Korean activities which he had just described. He urged that the equipment of the ROK armed forces be modernized and referred specifically to the need for fast patrol boats.

Mr. Berger pointed out that the fast patrol boats referred to were in the process of being delivered to Korea. Ambassador Kim countered by stating the ROK possessed only one destroyer and needed more. The Foreign Minister emphasized that in view of the establishment of small-scale guerrilla forces by the North Koreans, there was need for anti-infiltration equipment. Mr. Berger pointed out that a great deal of such equipment had already been provided to the ROK Government and that more was on the way.

Joint Working Group

The Foreign Minister then referred to the establishment of the joint US–ROK working group in Seoul, with military and economic sub-committees, to explore the extent to which the commitments made in Ambassador Brown’s letter of March 4, 1966, had been carried out. He reported that the military sub-committee had worked out a project for providing additional equipment and he hoped that the working group’s report, including this project, would soon be ready for submission.

ROK Participation in Viet-Nam

The Foreign Minister pointed out that the working group was also considering the problem of increasing ROK participation in programs in Viet-Nam. He said that although ROK exports in general were rising, his government wished to increase its exports to Viet-Nam. Participation was also desired in the pacification program in Viet-Nam. Mr. Berger pointed out that ROK receipts from Viet-Nam, including remittances, for the first half of 1967 totaled $60 million, which was equal to the total receipts from the same sources for all of 1966. The Foreign Minister did not deny the accuracy of these figures but said that his government keenly desired to increase exports to Viet-Nam. It also wished to participate in the pacification program and it had proposed a Korean Logistic Service Corps designed to relieve for combat duty troops now serving in rear areas. The Secretary asked if the KLSC was intended to be a military unit. The Foreign Minister replied that the intention was to have it comprise civilian reservists who would act as guards, drivers, etc., in the rear areas.

The Foreign Minister then referred to his government’s desire that Korean firms be given a chance to participate in bidding on contracts for delivery of goods and services in Viet-Nam. He alleged that Korean troops in Viet-Nam were wearing underwear manufactured in the United States and that Korean textile-makers should be given the opportunity to bid on such items. Mr. Berger reminded the Foreign Minister that certain actions had been taken above and beyond the commitments of the March 4 letter. He cited specifically the provision of Korean combat rations to the Korean troops in Viet-Nam.

The Foreign Minister said that the present situation in Viet-Nam was that large bids went to U.S. firms and small bids to Vietnamese firms. If the Koreans tried to compete on the small bids, it might cause difficulties with the Vietnamese. Therefore, they desired to share some of the contracts which now went to U.S. bidders. He said the National Assembly had set a deadline of mid-November, after which it had threatened to begin interpellations of the government on these subjects. He hoped, therefore, that the joint working group’s report would be finished by that deadline.

Mr. Berger commented that he was certain that the working group’s report would show that the U.S. Government had performed very well in living up to its commitments.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Drafted by Fleck and approved in S on November 17. The memorandum is Part III of VII. Memoranda of the remaining parts of the Rusk-Choe conversations are: Part I, “Korean Question in the United Nations” (ibid., POL 32–4 KOR/UN); Part II, “ROK Assistance Program in Africa” (ibid., AID(KOR S) 8 AFR); Part IV, “ROK Internal Developments” (ibid., AID(US) 15–9 KOR S); Part V, “ROK-Japan Relations” (ibid., POL JAPAN–KOR S); Part VI, “Summit Conference” (ibid., POL 27 KOR); and Part VII, “ROK Retaliation Against North Korea” (ibid., POL KOR N–KOR S). During his visit Choe also met with Bundy on November 13 and with McNamara on November 16. Memoranda of those conversations are ibid., POL 7 KOR S, and Washington National Records Center, RG 330,OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 2468, KOREA 091.112, respectively.
2. As recorded in Part VII, Rusk suggested to Choe that other governments in the UN Command should be discreetly apprised of the situation. Cautioning that the ROK should respond to North Korean actions with considerable restraint, Rusk reminded Choe of the consequences of any significant North-South conflict and stated that “if any such clash occurred the ROKG should appear to be the victim of aggression” since the ROK “needs the support and sympathy of many foreign governments” and, therefore, should keep its record clean. Rusk also instructed Kohler to discuss North Korean harassment of South Korea with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and to suggest to him that the USSR counsel restraint on the part of the North Koreans. (Memorandum of conversation, December 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL 23–7 KOR S)