Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland¹

Washington, June 17, 1964, 8:43 p.m.

2041. We naturally concerned indications declining Soviet interest in Polish proposal and have received somewhat conflicting reports Polish position. To take advantage favorable elements Polish position as reported from Ottawa and to follow up previous representations to Poles, Warsaw should deliver following personal oral message from Secretary to Rapacki.

Text of oral message:

You are already aware from my talks here with Ambassador Drozniak² before his departure of my deep concern over the situation in Laos and my hope that the constructive Polish proposal for six-nation consultations could lead to improvement.

As you know, the US subscribed to the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos, and we have no other object in Laos than to see them observed. We want no bases, no military presence nor any other special position in that country. It seems to me self-evident that, if all foreigners would simply leave Laos and let the Lao run their own affairs, Laos could be at peace and would create no problem for any of its neighbors. The Accords of 1962 in fact reflected this view.

In a broader sense, I think Your Excellency will agree that the 1962 Accords also held out hope that agreement on difficult political questions could be reached between Communists and non-Communists and faithfully carried out despite ideological differences. The violations of the Accords by the Hanoi regime thus call into question whether two different political systems can find ways to live in peace with each other and devote themselves to the betterment of their own peoples. For I must say to Your Excellency most solemnly that unless Hanoi and Peking leave their neighbors alone, the prospects for peace in SEA are dim.

Because the developing situation seemed to me so ominous, I was especially glad to see the Polish initiative calling for six-power consultations. It is our hope that these consultations can be held. The grouping your Government had suggested seemed to us particularly appropriate for the discussion of necessary measures to improve the military and political situation, without which it remains our strong feeling that no purpose could be served by a wider 14-nation conference.

We have of course noted the adverse comments on your proposal by the regime in Peking, and also by the Pathet Lao faction within Laos. We believe that the comments of Peking simply underscore the desirability of a smaller grouping that would be in a better position to ascertain the facts in a clear and objective manner and to take measures to restore the situation. As to the Pathet Lao position, we do not interpret anything they have said as a firm rejection of your proposal, and we believe that if an invitation could be promptly issued they would in fact be under great pressure to attend.

I recognize, of course, that there are various questions of fact concerning what has taken place in Laos not merely in the last month but over a period of nearly two years. There has not always been acknowledgment of what we have regarded as clear Pathet Lao and Viet Minh violations on the part of the non-Communist factions. Yet there should be no difference between us about the facts, and the Co-Chairmen and members of the International Control Commission are in a peculiarly strong position to establish exactly what has taken place.

In conclusion I should like to stress again my Government’s desire for a peaceful solution of the problem. As you know, we have recently supplied additional military aircraft to the Government of National Union in Laos at its express request, and have similarly engaged in reconnaissance operations, which we believe to be entirely justified in view of the military activity taking place and the inability of the International Control Commission to discharge its functions in areas under Pathet Lao control. In short, the limited measures we have taken have been made necessary by the persistent violations of the Geneva Accords of 1962 by the Pathet Lao and by Hanoi. So long as these gross violations continue, it has seemed necessary for us to let Hanoi know that the engulfment of Laos will not be accepted. Our purpose remains the fulfillment of the Accords of 1962, and the withdrawal of all foreign influence from Laos as those Accords intended. End text of oral message.

You should accompany this by amplification along lines previous telegrams and report status Polish thinking urgently.

Above drafted with knowledge Poles might be on point of revising their proposal, but prior receipt of London’s 6286.³ If by time your meeting with Rapacki you have received official word from Poles that they are modifying their proposal, you should make following changes in above message:

a) Change second sentence, fourth paragraph to read: “It was our hope that these consultations could be held.”

b) Change last sentence fifth paragraph to read: “As to the Pathet Lao position, we had not interpreted their statements as clearly rejecting your proposal, and we had thought that if an intervention were promptly issued, they would quite possibly accept. I very much hope, therefore, that the changes you are considering will not affect the essentials of your proposal.”

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Trueheart and William Bundy and cleared by George W. Jaeger, Staff Assistant, Bureau of European Affairs, and Rusk. Repeated to Vientiane, London, Moscow, Paris, New Delhi, Ottawa, Saigon, Bangkok, USUN, and CINCPAC.
2. An account of one of these talks on June 9 is in a memorandum of conversation, June 9. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 6286 from London, June 17, the Embassy reported that the Soviets stated there was no point discussing the original Polish proposal as the Poles had modified it. (Ibid.)