Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

9. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, February 28, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Southeast Asia: Deterioration in Laos

Following your February 26 meeting with Secretary McNamara and Mr. McCone on Laos, we have received reports from Ambassador Unger that the Phou Khe mountain complex commanding the southern approach to the Plaine des Jarres has fallen to Communist artillery assault. This Communist success puts them in a position to move effectively against the Plaine des Jarres and to dominate the routes southward toward Tha Thom. Although Souvanna has already asked the ICC to take appropriate action to restore the situation as soon as possible, we can have no assurance that the Communist side will not continue to advance against neutralist/conservative positions in both northern and central Laos.

This is a serious new development. It is typical Pathet Lao/Viet Minh tactics to strike and then wait for our reaction; if we do not react, then they strike again. Conversely, when we have reacted, these Communist salami tactics have been checked. Under the circumstances, I believe that we cannot afford to delay on a decision to introduce additional US forces into Thailand, bearing in mind that the other recommendations in our Laos action plan will not be sufficient to warn and deter the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh.

We understand from Bill Bundy this morning that Secretary McNamara shares our concern over this latest Communist advance at Phou Khe and is prepared to move ahead with quietly introducing 12 more F–100’s into Thailand, bringing our squadron there to full strength of 18 aircraft.

I agree that we should proceed with the F–100 deployment, although we would first have to notify the Thais in the context of our larger plan for Laos.

However, I also believe that we should now make the decision to proceed with some US ground force deployment to Thailand. I do not suggest that it be a full battle group but could, as McGeorge Bundy suggested at our meeting, be half that size. It might also be desirable that the ground forces be introduced shortly after the F–100s. Such phasing would give us more time to discuss and coordinate with the Thais, without holding up on the F–100s.

Recommendation:²

That at lunch with the Secretary of Defense and McGeorge Bundy today you discuss with him the following recommendations:

1. That we now decide to deploy promptly to Thailand 12 more F–100 aircraft to bring the squadron to full strength of 18;

2. That we decide as soon as possible in favor of moving some ground forces to Thailand at an early date following the introduction of the F–100s;

3. That we authorize Ambassador Martin immediately to consult fully with the Thais along the lines indicated in the draft memorandum to the President, including our intentions with regard to the introduction of F–100s and ground forces.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 ASIA SE. Secret. Drafted by Green. There is a note on this memorandum indicating that Rusk saw it.
2. In telegram 1461 to Bangkok, February 28, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to inform the Thai Government that it was prepared, if Thailand agreed, to send 12 additional F–100’s to bring up to full strength the U.S. fighter detachment in Thailand. Although not authorized to make further commitments, the Embassy should consult with Thai leaders on the situation in Laos. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS)