Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

67. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at Bangkok¹

Washington, May 29, 1964, 8:24 p.m.

Tosec 36. For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary.² Following represents general consensus of meetings today which included McNamara, Attorney General, Stevenson, General Taylor, General Carter, McGeorge Bundy, and Harriman on line of action re Laos.³ Prior to formal presentation of recommendations to President, would appreciate your views after such discussion as you may desire to have with Martin and Unger.⁴

There was general feeling that our objective should at minimum be seek prevent further deterioration in Laos and take action directed toward restoration status quo ante May 16th. Matter viewed not just from standpoint of Laos but also morale effects in SVN, Thailand and much of underdeveloped world. Also general consensus that no hope of achieving foregoing objectives by negotiation, whatever the forum, without some clear expression of US determination and will that US not willing write off Laos to Communists. While we initially would seek to treat Lao question separate from SVN-NVN problem, if satisfactory Lao solution not achieved basis should have been laid for possible subsequent actions that would permit our dealing more effectively with NVN with respect both SVN and Laos.

Against foregoing background, we felt initial step should be acceptance of appropriately modified or interpreted Polish proposal (full text being transmitted by septel)⁵ accompanied by firm assurance from us to Souvanna that we would be prepared to give him prompt and direct military support if the Polish conference was not successful.

We recognize that, before making such commitment to Souvanna, it would be necessary for us to obtain agreement of Thailand. However, we assume that, under circumstances outlined herein, this could be obtained.

Contrary to views set forth Circular 2209,⁶ which was not given seventh floor clearance, we now feel that Polish proposal probably offers best initial forum to seek to work out solution. It would:

1. Provide alternative to UN (where, in absence French support, we would probably be unable harness seven votes for useful proposition in Security Council) or another fourteen-nation conference. US support of such a meeting would be additional (and least damaging in terms SVN and Thai interests) demonstration our willingness seek peaceful settlement.

2. Short of partition or US occupation Lao territory, our best hope of keeping some non-Communist Government in being in Laos remains through some form of agreement, however fragile, among the Lao themselves. If Lao not able reach agreement, we will at least have established once again that Communist faction alone refuses to cooperate with other two and we will be on more solid ground take further action.

3. Such a meeting would provide forum for negotiation without French, Chinese Communists, or North Vietnamese. Souvanna’s conditions and our continued support for them would have better chance of being justified and maintained in such a forum than at either the fourteen-nation Geneva conference or the UN.

4. Polish proposal does not threaten to raise question of Cambodia or South Viet-Nam as would fourteen-nation conference or UN debate, and should minimize problems in SVN of any conference on Laos.

5. Souvanna could go to such a conference without abandoning, and in fact he should not abandon, his preconditions for any fourteen-nation conference. Essential to acceptability of Polish proposal is recognition of Souvanna Phouma’s position as Prime Minister of RLG. Polish formula appears leave room for negotiation on this point.

6. By providing a forum which includes Soviets but excludes ChiComs, such a conference keeps Soviets seized of Laos problem in context most useful to our interests.

To carry out foregoing, we would envision scenario along following lines:

1. Begin discussions with Souvanna, Thais, French, UK and USSR.

2. Assuming outcome of foregoing discussions favorable, Souvanna would undertake, with our support, discussions with Poles to obtain whatever reformulation or interpretation of their proposal may be required to obtain recognition Souvanna would be attending such a conference as PM of Government of National Union and sole spokesman for that Government. Representatives of other two factions would be attending solely as representatives of those factions.

3. Subject to satisfactory outcome foregoing, Souvanna would accept participation in Polish conference while maintaining his present preconditions for participation in any fourteen-nation conference.

4. In agreeing to attend conference, Souvanna would seek to improve bargaining position by making it clear, publicly or privately, in manner agreed with us and Thai Government, that, in event conference not successful, US would provide prompt and direct military support along lines described para 6 below. (Study being given here to question of Congressional consultation or approval of such future US force commitments, taking account of SEATO obligations.)

5. Souvanna would at same time request assistance of US (and possibly others) in reequipping his forces and we would immediately initiate such resupply through present channels.

6. If Polish conference not successful or in meanwhile Pathet Lao/Viet Minh significantly advance toward Mekong from present positions, we would, in response to Souvanna request, immediately deploy to Thailand an international force and initiate selective air strikes against Pathet Lao/Viet Minh supply lines and installations. (Note: We would not attempt at this time exactly to define what would be an acceptable degree of “success” but at minimum feel it would require reestablishment of some Kong Le presence in Plaine des Jarres. Whether such air strikes would at least initially be confined to Laos or include targets in North Viet-Nam would be determined at the time in the light of developments in the total Southeast Asia scenario.)

7. At the time of deployment to Thailand, accompanying Security Council action would be taken by Souvanna and/or ourselves in which our position would be that we were prepared to yield in favor of the UN if and when the UN reached agreement on appropriate measures to restore the situation. Decision would have to be made at the time with respect to exact time relationship between UN moves (by Souvanna as well as ourselves) and our military moves.⁷

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent also to New Delhi. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared by Ball.
2. For Rusk’s itinerary, see footnote 2, Document 65.
3. The meetings took place at 11 a.m. and 4 p.m. A combined summary record of them is in a May 30 memorandum by Read. In addition to the individuals named in the cable, McNaughton, Colby, Cooper, Gaud, and Rowan attended the meetings. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
4. In Secto 25 from Bangkok, May 30, Rusk stated that he concurred generally with the reasoning and scenario outlined below although he had a number of questions and observations. (Ibid.)
5. Transmitted in Tosec 37 to Bangkok, May 29. (Ibid.)
6. Dated May 27. (Ibid.)
7. Printed from an unsigned copy.