Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

65. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Ball¹

Washington, May 28, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Implications of the Polish Proposal on Laos for US Interests²

Yesterday, the Polish Government, obviously with Soviet approval if not on Soviet instruction, suggested a meeting at a neutral site between representatives of the Geneva Co-chairmen, the ICC member nations, and the three Lao factions. The following are our initial views on the implications of such a meeting for US interests.

For this discussion, we assume US interests to be to retain as nearly as possible the Geneva solution—as opposed to some form of partition—with the minimum use of US military force.

Such a meeting, to be sure, could become merely a back door to a full Geneva conference. It could also lead the British and the Canadians, now apparently firmly behind Souvanna, and even Souvanna himself into making concessions to achieve at least the appearance of progress. However, these dangers are probably common to any purely political and diplomatic efforts directed toward resolving the problem of Laos. Although its prospects for achieving a successful settlement would be remote, we believe that such a meeting could have certain tactical advantages. These might make it to the interests of the United States to keep the proposal open, assuming it is acceptable to the Lao factions, as an alternative to Article 4 consultations should the latter break down or prove ineffective.

We see the tactical advantages of a meeting such as that proposed by the Poles as follows:

1) It would give the US another forum in which to work out a solution before going either to the UN or another 14 nation conference. The failure of such a meeting to produce agreement could bolster the argument of the futility of proceeding to Geneva.

2) Short of partition or of occupying Lao territory with United States forces, our best hope of keeping a non-communist government in being in Laos remains through some form of agreement, however fragile, among the Lao themselves. It should be remembered that the 1961–62 Geneva Conference could never have reached agreement if the Lao themselves had not agreed at Zurich to form a coalition government under Souvanna and at the Plaine des Jarres on the composition of the cabinet. Therefore, if there is any chance that the Lao might still reach agreement among themselves, we should encourage the chance. If there is no such chance we will at least have established once again that it is the Communist faction alone which refuses to cooperate with the other two, and will be on more solid ground to take further action.

3) The closer the United States comes to direct intervention the more disastrous it would be should Souvanna back down. If there is any chance that he will get off the train at some future stop, it should become apparent at such a meeting. If he should back down on his own conditions for a Geneva Conference it would be preferable for him to do it before we have committed United States troops and prestige to the support of these conditions. Such a meeting would test Souvanna’s determination.

4) Such a meeting would provide a forum for negotiation in the absence of the French, the Chinese Communists and the North Vietnamese. Souvanna’s conditions and our continued support for them would have a better chance of being justified and maintained at such a forum than at either a Geneva Conference or the UN.

5) Finally, the Polish proposal does not threaten to raise the question of Cambodia or South Vietnam as would a 14 nation conference or a UN debate.

In short, such a meeting would provide optimum conditions for Souvanna to establish his position with the very parties he must deal with sooner or later. In the absence of the French and the Asian Communists, Souvanna would be under less pressure to compromise. And no matter what the outcome, the United States need not be committed to anything Souvanna has not agreed to himself.

Probable Soviet Tactics

The main advantage of any Geneva-type conference, in Moscow’s view, would be to forestall strong US countermeasures against the communists in Laos. The Russians may see the Polish-proposed meeting simply as a means of easing the West into a full-blown Geneva conference. However, they probably prefer the Polish plan which would get negotiations started in a forum excluding the two major Soviet adversaries, the United States and Communist China.

It is difficult to predict Soviet tactics with any precision in the absence of reaction from both the Asian communists and from the Lao principals themselves.

The Polish proposal suggests that a cease-fire might be an acceptable precondition, but Moscow would probably be unwilling and almost certainly unable to obtain compliance with Souvanna’s demands for a Pathet Lao withdrawal from the Plaine des Jarres advances. The Polish statement also proposes that Laos be represented at the meeting by the three factions and does not refer to the Royal Lao Government or to Premier Souvanna Phouma. However, Moscow probably would try to work out a compromise formula to accommodate both Souvanna and the Pathet Lao. We believe that Moscow will seek to get the coalition government into operation again as a promising alternative to further polarization with the dangers of all-out war and US involvement. Therefore, the Soviets would support Pathet Lao demands that the neutralist-rightist merger be ended. Moscow probably would not agree to more effective ICC functioning; indeed it might seek to insure that no majority activities could be undertaken in the future.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Secret.
2. The text of this assessment was sent to Rusk at New Delhi in Tosec 26, May 28. (Ibid.) Rusk and William Bundy visited New Delhi May 28–30, Saigon and Bangkok May 31, and Honolulu on June 1 for a conference on Vietnam. For accounts of Rusk’s meetings in Saigon and Honolulu, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 405–433.